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Gillette v. Town of Monroe12/28/1999
that standard to the facts as he found them, the commissioner concluded that the plaintiff's preemployment physical examination revealed evidence of heart disease and that consequently, under § 7-433c, he was not entitled to heart disease benefits. The commissioner also applied the rationale of Suprenant v. New Britain, 28 Conn. App. 754, 759, 611 A.2d 941 (1992) (preemployment examination evidence of either heart disease or hypertension precludes subsequent claim based on either condition), and dismissed the hypertension claim. Both parties subsequently filed motions to correct the trial commissioner's findings, which were denied.
The plaintiff thereafter petitioned the board for review of the commissioner's ruling. The board, with one member dissenting, affirmed the commissioner's ruling. The majority noted that Williams' dual capacity as the plaintiff's physician and the town's police surgeon understandably caused Williams to believe that elaborating on the plaintiff's medical history in the 1965 report was unnecessary since "a `yes' or `no' recommendation regarding the [plaintiff's] fitness for duty would be adequate and wholly determinative." The majority further stated that because § 7-433c was not in effect at the time of the 1965 preemployment physical examination, Williams had no impetus for specifically reporting the plaintiff's heart disease to the town and, therefore, the commissioner was justified in looking outside the four corners of the report. Having reached that conclusion, the majority further concluded that the commissioner's evaluation of the evidence was in no way suspect and that the inference drawn therefrom, namely, that the plaintiff suffered from congenital heart disease in 1965, was reasonable. The board therefore affirmed the trial commissioner's ruling and this appeal followed. I.
The plaintiff asserts that the commissioner improperly considered information not contained in the preemployment physical examination report in concluding that the plaintiff had not established entitlement to hypertension and heart disease benefits under § 7-433c. The plaintiff also contends that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's decision. We agree on both counts.
We first set forth the standards governing our review of decisions by the board. " hen a decision of a commissioner is appealed to the [board], the [board] is obligated to hear the appeal on the record of the hearing before the commissioner and not to retry the facts. Fair v. People's Savings Bank, 207 Conn. 535, 538-39, 542 A.2d 1118 (1988). The commissioner has the power and duty, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts. Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 435, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988). The conclusions drawn by him from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, [177 Conn. 107, 118, 411 A.2d 924 (1979)]. Id. Our scope of review of the actions of the review [board] is similarly limited. DeBarros v. Singleton, 21 Conn. App. 107, 110, 572 A.2d 69 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vanzant v. Hall, 219 Conn. 674, 677, 594 A.2d 967 (1991). "Where, however, the appeal involves an issue of statutory construction that has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, this court has plenary power to review the administrative decision. See Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995) (state agency not entitled to special deference when its construction of statute has not undergone previous judicial scrutiny)." Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692, 697, 699 A.2d 52 (1997).
Because the resolution of this appeal presents a nov
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