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Gillette v. Town of Monroe12/28/1999
el issue of statutory construction, we further set forth the well established principles of statutory construction on which we rely. " ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336, 339, 684 A.2d 1181 (1996).
Section 7-433c (a) provides in relevant part that "in the event . . . a regular member of a paid municipal police department who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease, suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability, he or his dependents, as the case may be, shall receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care . . . ." (Emphasis added.) This language clearly and unambiguously mandates that for the plaintiff to be foreclosed from the benefits of the statute, the results of his preemployment physical examination must contain evidence of hypertension or heart disease. The commissioner's findings show that Williams' August 2, 1965 report is the only source from which we can ascertain the results of the preemployment physical examination. It is beyond doubt that the language of that report does not indicate in any way that the plaintiff exhibited symptoms consistent with either hypertension or heart disease. We therefore must conclude that the plaintiff's examination did not "reveal any evidence" of either condition.
The decision of the trial commissioner also is inconsistent with other parts of the statute. Section 7-433c (a) further provides that " f successful passage of such a physical examination was, at the time of . . . employment, required as a condition for such employment, no proof or record of such examination shall be required as evidence in the maintenance of a claim . . . ." (Emphasis added.) To say that an examination report, such as the one in the present case, that makes no mention of either hypertension or heart disease, can be disregarded, while a plaintiff whose examination is not reported at all is afforded the presumption of compensability, would render the statute illogical and inconsistent.
Furthermore, an interpretation allowing the consideration of evidence not contained in the preemployment physical examination would frustrate the purpose of § 7-433c as set forth by the legislature in the statute. Second-guessing a report that gave the plaintiff a clean bill of health, on which he may have justifiably relied, would effectively deprive him of the benefit conferred by the legislature and certainly would not "act as an inducement in attracting and securing persons" for employment as regular members of paid police departments.
In reaching the conclusion that, in this case, the evidence called for in § 7-433c must be contained, if at all, in the four corners of Williams' report, we are mindful of the board's concern that the statute at issue was not in effect at the time of the plaintiff's preemployment physical examination. A review of the history of the relevant heart and hypertension legislation leads us to conclude that the town was on notice that whether the plaintiff exhibited symptoms consistent with heart disease or hypertension at the time of his hire h
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