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King v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services12/16/1999
the examiner concluded that King was excluded from the coverage of the Act, inasmuch as his employment was not principally localized in the District of Columbia.
On review, the Director of the Department of Employment Services affirmed the hearing examiner's decision. Specifically approving the examiner's analysis of the coverage question, the Director stated:
Claimant testified at the hearing that he had experienced back pain before April 11, 1994. Specifically, Claimant testified that his back pain began in December of 1993 but did not become disabling until April 11, 1994. This in the Director's opinion, and as correctly concluded by the Hearing Examiner, would make Claimant's injury a cumulative one in which there is no definitive date of injury. There being no definitive date of injury, the 1991 amendment to the Act would not applicable in this matter. Therefore, the Hearing Examiner was correct in utilizing pre-existing legislation as well as the interpretation established in the Hughes case in order to determine whether jurisdiction was conferred upon Claimant's injury.
On appeal, King argues that (1) he sustained an aggravating injury on April 11, 1994, in the District of Columbia, a factual issue which the hearing examiner failed to resolve, and (2) even if there was no identifiable injury on April 11 and his injury reasonably could be termed "cumulative," the hearing examiner erred as a matter of law in failing to determine a "time of injury," which is a prerequisite to applying D.C. Code § 36-303 (a). King argues that, for purposes of that statute, the hearing examiner and the Director should have ruled that he sustained his injury while at work in the District of Columbia, and therefore that his claim was covered by the WCA pursuant to subsection (a)(1). (King does not contend that his employment was principally localized within the District; rather, he contends that the locus of his employment was immaterial given that his injury occurred when he was in the District.) Moonlighting and ITT Hartford, on the other hand, ask us to affirm the denial of King's claim on the grounds that (1) King was not injured on April 11, and (2) medical testimony established that his disability was attributable to a natural progression of his longstanding back ailments that was unrelated to his employment.
II.
For an administrative agency decision to "pass muster" under the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act ("DCAPA"), D.C. Code §§ 1-1501 et seq. (1999),
(1) the [agency's] decision must state findings of fact on each material, contested factual issue;
(2) those findings must be based on substantial evidence; and
(3) the conclusions of law must flow rationally from the findings. Washington Times v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 724 A.2d 1212, 1216 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Perkins v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 482 A.2d 401, 402 (D.C. 1984)).
Given the posture in which this case comes to us, we deem it appropriate to reemphasize that " he agency is required to make basic findings of fact on all material issues. Only then can this court determine upon review whether the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether those findings lead rationally to its conclusions of law." Brown v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 700 A.2d 787, 792 (D.C. 1997) (citations omitted). "If the agency `fails to make a finding on a material, contested issue of fact, this court cannot fill the gap by making its own determination from the record, but must remand the case for findings on that issue.'" Mack v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employ
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