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King v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services12/16/1999
ment Servs., 651 A.2d 804, 806 (D.C. 1994) (quoting Colton v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 484 A.2d 550, 552 (D.C. 1984)).
Where, as in this case, "questions of law are concerned, this court reviews the agency's rulings de novo . . . ." Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 683 A.2d 470, 472 (D.C. 1996). To be sure, " n agency's interpretation of its own regulations or of the statute which it administers is generally entitled to great deference from this court. There is, however, a well-recognized exception to this rule. When the agency's decision is inconsistent with the applicable statute . . . we owe it far less deference, if indeed we owe it any deference at all." Columbia Realty Venture v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 590 A.2d 1043, 1046 (D.C. 1991) (citations omitted). " f the agency's decision is based upon a material misconception of the law, this court will reject it." Jerome Management, Inc. v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 682 A.2d 178, 182 (D.C. 1996).
Nonetheless, where the meaning of a statute is unclear, we will "accord considerable weight to its construction by the agency responsible for administering" it. Harris v. District of Columbia Office of Workers' Compensation, 660 A.2d 404, 407 (D.C. 1995). " rdinarily," therefore, "this court will not attempt to interpret the agency's statute until the agency itself has done so." Wahlne v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 704 A.2d 1196, 1199 (D.C. 1997). Instead, we will remand to permit the agency to engage in the necessary analysis of the legislation it is charged with carrying out. See id.; see also Proctor v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 737 A.2d 534, 539, 541 (D.C. 1999); Mushroom Transp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 698 A.2d 430, 434 (D.C. 1997). In particular, a dispute over the coverage of the law -such as we have in the case now before us - "is quintessentially a decision for the [agency] to make in the first instance, involving, as it does, a situation where an agency is delegated broad authority to administer a statutory scheme." Taggart-Wilson v. District of Columbia, 675 A.2d 28, 29 (D.C. 1996).
With these principles of appellate review in mind, we turn to the issues raised by the present petition for review.
III.
When the Council originally enacted the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act of 1979, it provided in D.C. Code § 36-303 that an injured worker could recover benefits under the WCA only if the employment was "principally localized in the District" at the time the injury occurred, regardless of where the injury occurred. See supra note 3. This meant that employees who were injured on the job in the District of Columbia could not recover under D.C. law if their employment was principally localized outside the District when they sustained their injuries. See Hughes, 498 A.2d at 569-70 (Council made a deliberate choice in the 1979 Act in favor of narrowing workers' compensation coverage).
In 1991, the Council amended § 36-303 to broaden the coverage of the WCA so as to protect all employees who are injured on the job in the District, regardless of the principal locus of their employment. As explained in the legislative history of the amendment:
This section is amended to change the focus of entitlement of an injured worker to compensation for an injury or death from the location where the employee's employment is "principally localized" to the location where the injury or death occurred. Forty-nine of fifty jurisdictions use a situs rule . . . . Thus, the recommended change states that the
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