 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
King v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services12/16/1999
y. The hearing examiner did not resolve this dispute. He did not make any findings, from the medical testimony or otherwise, regarding the medical nature of King's back condition or the work-relatedness of King's disability. He did not determine whether the medical evidence regarding the source of King's disability was substantial enough to rebut the statutory presumption of coverage. He did not determine whether King suffered a discrete, aggravating injury on April 11, 1994, while at work in the District. Although the examiner assumed that King attributed his disability to a cumulative trauma, he did not determine for a fact whether King actually sustained such trauma from his job. The Director likewise did not make these determinations in reviewing the examiner's decision.
These fact-intensive determinations, essential to resolving the coverage question in this case, turn in large measure on the evaluation of the medical testimony and evidence. We do not have the authority to examine this evidence and make our own conclusions. See Mack, 651 A.2d at 806. That factual inquiry is the responsibility of the hearing examiner. We must remand to the agency to make findings on these issues.
Cumulative Trauma and Time of Injury
If on remand the examiner finds that King did not suffer an aggravating injury on April 11, 1994, but that he did become disabled on that date as the result of cumulative work-related trauma, then coverage depends on the rule that is selected for fixing the time of injury in such a case for purposes of D.C. Code § 36-303 (a). We recognize that a specific time of injury may be difficult to pinpoint for a cumulative trauma injury; however, given the statutory language, it is necessary to develop a consistent approach to that issue.
In this and other jurisdictions, courts and agencies have confronted the issue of specifying the time of injury in various contexts. Different rules have been proposed and adopted, with the choice depending in large part on the policies to be served and the costs and benefits attendant on each alternative - which we consider a strong reason in favor of directing the agency to grapple with the matter and to articulate a rule in the first instance.
According to Professor Larson,
The practical problem of fixing a specific date for the accident has generally been handled by saying simply that the date of accident is the date on which disability manifests itself. Thus, in the Ptak[ ] case, the date of a gradually acquired sacroiliac strain was deemed to be the first moment the pain made it impossible to continue work, and in the Di Maria [ ] case, the date of accident for gradual loss of use of the hands was held to be the date on which this development finally prevented claimant from performing his work. However, for certain purposes the date of accident may be identified with the onset of pain occasioning medical attention, although the effect of the pain may have been merely to cause difficulty in working and not complete inability to work.
A. Larson, 3 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 50.05, at 50-9-10 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
King argues that the time of injury in a cumulative trauma case should be fixed in accordance with the so-called "manifestation rule." There is case support for King's argument in this jurisdiction, though the precise question presented in this case has not been settled. Moreover, as the quoted passage reveals, there is no single "manifestation" rule; rather, there are several variant rules.
The Department of Employment Services utilized a manifestation rule in at least one cumulative traumatic injury case prior to the 1991
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 District of Columbia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|