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Whirl v. Safeco Insurance Company12/20/1999
This subrogation action, brought under OCGA § 33-7-11 (f), presents an issue of first impression in this state: Does the two-year statute of limitation for a personal injury claim (9-3-33) apply to an insurer who brings a subrogation action under OCGA § 33-7-11 (f) to recover for the uninsured motorist personal injury payments it made to its insured or does OCGA § 33-7-11 (f) create a statutory right of subrogation that gives the insurer, pursuant to OCGA § 9-3-22, twenty years from the date of the collision to file suit? We conclude that, under the plain and unequivocal language of OCGA § 33-7-11 (f), in a subrogation action by an insurer to recover personal injury payments it made to its insured under Georgia's Uninsured's Motorist Act, an insurer is bound by the two-year statute of limitation that is applicable to the insured to whom the insurer is subrogated, because the insurer stands in the shoes of its insured. Thus, we reverse the ruling of the trial court.
On July 13, 1995, Willie E. Richmond was involved in an automobile collision with Shawn Whirl, appellant. When the collision occurred, Whirl did not have liability insurance as required by law. Richmond was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Safeco Insurance Company ("Safeco"), appellee. Under the policy's uninsured motorist provisions, Safeco paid Richmond for damages he sustained as a result of the collision in the amount of $788.04 for property damage and $15,000.00 for personal injuries.
On October 26, 1998, more than two years after the date of the collision, Safeco instituted this subrogation action against Whirl to recover both the property damage and personal injury uninsured motorist benefits paid to Richmond. Whirl timely answered and raised the affirmative defense that the suit was barred by the statute of limitation for personal injuries. Thereafter, Whirl moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Safeco's personal injury subrogation claim was barred by the statute of limitation since it had not been commenced within two years of the July 13, 1995 collision. On April 14, 1999, the trial court denied Whirl's motion and held that, under OCGA § 9-3-22, the statute of limitations for a subrogation claim brought pursuant to OCGA § 33-7-11 (f) is twenty years. This Court granted Whirl's application for interlocutory review, and this appeal followed. Held:
In construing OCGA § 33-7-11 (f) to determine what statute of limitation is applicable, it is fundamental that the determining factor is the intent of the legislature and we look first to the words of the statute to determine what the intent was and if those words be plain and unambiguous and the intent may be clearly gathered thereform, we need look no further in determining what that intent was. In fact, where the language of an Act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but is forbidden. (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Walck, 192 Ga. App. 754, 756 (386 SE2d 521) (1989).
Moreover, here possible, effect is to be given to all the words of a statute, and it is firmly established that courts should not interpret a statute so as to render parts of it surplusage or meaningless. (Punctuation and citations omitted.) In The Interest of R. F. T., 228 Ga. App. 719, 722 (492 SE2d 590) (1997).
The Uninsured Motorist Act was passed by Ga. L. 1963, p. 588. From the inception of such act, the legislature granted the insurer, who pays a claim to its insured under the act, the right to be subrogated to the rights of the insured to whom such claim was paid against the person causing such injury, death, or damage to the extent that payment was made; inc
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