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U.S. Filter Distribution Group12/14/1999
is time computation would have allowed U.S. filter to file its lien after the three month period expired because the three month period expired on a weekend. Because the lien statute is in derogation of common law and is strictly construed, we find that it falls within the exception provided in OCGA § 1-3-1 (d) (3).
In effect, a materialman's lien allows the transfer of liability from the person who actually contracted with the materialman for materials to be used in improving real estate to the owner of the improved property, even though that property owner has no relationship with the materialman. Consequently, both the Supreme Court and this court have consistently held that the materialman lien statute is in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner and against the materialman. Palmer v. Duncan Wholesale, 262 Ga. 28, 29-30 (1) (413 SE2d 437) (1992); Womack Indus. v. B & A Equipment Co., 199 Ga. App. 660, 661 (1) (405 SE2d 880) (1991). We have specifically held that the intent of OCGA § 44-14-361.1 as to timely filing of liens is to establish a time certain beyond which liens cannot be filed, for the protection of the contracting parties and innocent third parties. Womack Indus., supra.
Contrary to U.S. Filter's argument, Davis v. Desa International, 209 Ga. App. 318 (433 SE2d 410) (1993), is not analogous to this case. In Davis, we held that the time computation method in OCGA § 1-3-1 (d) (3) applies to the requirement that personal injury actions must be brought within two years after the right of action accrues. We concluded that the exception for "time period computations specifically applying to other laws" did not apply because the statute addressing personal injury actions did not itself provide for any method of computing the two-year period provided within the statute. Davis, supra at 319. However, the statute addressing personal injury actions is not in derogation of common law and is not strictly construed.
While there is no specific method of time computation provided for in the lien statute itself, we refuse to extend the filing requirement by imposing the method of time computation prescribed in OCGA § 1-3-1 (d) (3). The materialman's lien statute requires that a lien be filed "within three months." Strictly construed, U.S. Filter's lien filing did not meet this statutory requirement. The trial court correctly denied U.S. Filter's motion for summary judgment.
2. Based on our holding in Division 1, we need not reach U.S. Filter's remaining enumeration of error.
Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P. J., and Phipps, J., concur.
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