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Perry v. State12/10/1999
n sense.
As the Iowa Supreme Court has noted:
Generally, when a statute receives a certain judicial interpretation and is subsequently reenacted without pertinent change, such interpretation is presumed adopted or approved by the legislature.
But the foregoing presumption is not conclusive. It stands only as one factor among many in determining legislative intent. . . .
Neither does [the presumption] nor the pressures of stare decisis prevent our reconsideration, repair, correction, or abandonment of past judicial pronouncements, especially when error is manifest. Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Iowa 1978) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Parks v. City of Marshalltown, 440 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1989).
The Appellate Court of Illinois has also stated:
The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring a reviewing court to blindly follow its own precedents. While considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, especially where the legislature is free to change the court's interpretation of its legislation, a reviewing court should not decline to correct a prior interpretation which it finds erroneous . . . and a court may depart from a prior settled rule where it becomes evident that it is prejudicial to the public interest. Mueller v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 267 Ill. App. 3d 726, 732, 643 N.E.2d 255, 260-61 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Conway v. Town of Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 676, 680 A.2d 242, 254 (1996) ("Our decision that we should not overrule precedent unless cogent reason and inescapable logic require it has particular force when the precedent involved concerns the interpretation or construction of a statute. There may well be precedent nevertheless that, when challenged and reexamined, mandates that ` udicial honesty dictates corrective action.'" (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah 1987) ("As a practical matter, we can and do, on occasion, depart from a prior statutory interpretation."); Jepson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 89 Wash. 2d 394, 407, 573 P.2d 10, 17 (1977) ("The doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable to statutory construction when it is decided that earlier interpretations are wanting, faulty, or even wrong." (citation omitted)).
The Court initially noted in Mustafa, 323 Md. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485, that " he exclusionary provision in § 10-405 of the Maryland [Wiretap] Act precludes the admission of evidence which was not lawfully intercepted." Our primary holding was that "the Maryland [Wiretap] Act precludes the admission of a communication intercepted, no matter where, under circumstances inconsistent with this State's substantive law." Id. at 75, 591 A.2d at 486 (emphasis added). The particular section with which the Court was concerned was section 10-402 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides that any willful interception, endeavor to intercept, any willful disclosure, or endeavor to disclose or any willful use, or endeavor to use, any contents of wire, oral, or electronic communications not obtained in accordance with other provisions of the Maryland Wiretap Act, is unlawful. The Maryland statute defines violations of its requirements as felonies. See id. § 10-402(b).
The "exclusionary" section of the Wiretap Act provides: § 10-405. Admissibility of evidence.
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of the communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial . . . if the disclosure of
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