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McGuin v. State Compensation Insurance Fund12/16/1999
e requirements of Sec. 603 any more strictly than we have would defeat the public policy objective for the Workers' Compensation Act as set forth in Sec. 39-71-105(1), MCA (1987).
That section provides that:
It is an objective of the Montana workers' compensation system to provide, without regard to fault, wage supplement and medical benefits to a worker suffering from a work-related injury or disease.
That objective cannot be accomplished if we construe Sec. 603 so narrowly that it erects insurmountable barriers to collection of disability benefits, when they are unrelated to any legitimate public policy. 254 Mont. at 521, 839 P.2d at 1265-66. I note that this decision was under the 1989 version of the Workers' Compensation Act, after the liberal construction rule was repealed. Together these two cases establish one clear principle, which is: section 39-71-603, MCA, requires a claimant only to disclose what he knows, it does not require the impossible.
There are two prongs to the notice requirement. The first is notice of the accident. The second is notice of the injury . Bodily holds that notice of the accident is not required where the worker is unaware that his medical condition is in any way related to his employment. Killebrew holds that even though the notice requirement "is not tolled where the employee is unaware of the severity or compensable nature of his injury," Killebrew, 254 Mont. at 519, 839 P.2d at 1264 (citing Reil v. Billings Processors, Inc. 229 Mont. 305, 7846 P.2d. 617 (1987); Roessel v. Rivendell of Billings, 244 Mont. 175, 797 P.2d 174 (1990)); the statute is, in effect, tolled, where the worker is in fact unaware of any injury. Read together, the two decisions hold that the statute is satisfied where the worker reports as much as he or she knows.
Bodily and Killebrew involved different prongs of the notice requirement. This case involves both. Here, claimant timely reported the fact that he was unable to complete his float to his supervising lieutenant but did not report any specific incident suggesting that he was involved in an accident or that he suffered an injury or unusual strain. However, he had no reason to believe that an accident occurred or that he was injured. He did not report his specific symptoms, however, he had no reason to do so since he apparently ascribed them to his asthma, not to any injury occurring during the river float. At the time he reported to his lieutenant he had no reason to believe that his inability to complete his river float was anything other than coincidental to a non work-related condition. Under Bodily and Killebrew, read together, his 1986 report to his lieutenant satisfied section 39- 71-603, MCA (1985).
The law concerning claim filing is even clearer. Despite the one-year filing requirement, ยง 39-71-601, MCA (1985), the Supreme Court has held that the period is tolled "until the claimant, as a reasonable man, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable, compensable character of his latent injury ." Bowerman v. Employment Security Commission, 207 Mont. 314, 319, 673 P.2d 476, 479 (1983). "Latent" means hidden or invisible. The injury in this case was clearly latent. Claimant's condition was not even suspected until April 1997, in large part because of his underlying allergies, asthma, and sinus infections. Bowerman applies. The one-year filing requirement did not start running until 1997 and was satisfied by the filing of the claim in November of 1997.
Finally, the Court must address the State Fund's contention that it is relieved of liability because the claimant's condition was materially aggravated by claimant's 1988 and 1991 dives. The St
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