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Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co.12/22/1999
District Court concluded that since the Olivers could not show that any of the Defendants deliberately destroyed evidence to prevent the Olivers from pursuing a third-party claim, the Olivers were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act from bringing a negligence action against Mr. Oliver's employer and/or his employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier. Stimson sides with the District Court in its conclusion that the Act bars the Olivers' claim against it. The Olivers assert that a cause of action for spoliation of evidence is an interference with a property interest rather than a personal injury, which falls outside the exclusivity provisions of the Act. We agree with the Olivers.
The applicable provision of the Act provides:
For all employments covered under the Workers' Compensation Act or for which an election has been made for coverage under this chapter, the provisions of this chapter are exclusive. . . . an employer is not subject to any liability whatever for the death of or personal injury to an employee covered by the Workers' Compensation Act or for any claims for contribution or indemnity asserted by a third person from whom damages are sought on account of such injuries or death. Section 39-71-411, MCA (1993) (emphasis added).
We have previously stated the rationale for the adoption of workers' compensation legislation was to "guarantee workers with work-related injuries some form of compensation in exchange for relinquishing any potential tort claims against their employers." Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County (1996), 276 Mont. 67, 74, 915 P.2d 175, 179. This quid pro quo between employers and employees is central to the Act and it is axiomatic that the employee have some possibility of recovery for the compromise to hold. Stratemeyer, 276 Mont. at 75, 915 P.2d at 179.
A compensable injury under the Act is defined as follows:
(1) "Injury" or "injured" means:
(a) internal or external physical harm to the body;
(c) death.
(2) An injury is caused by an accident. An accident is:
(a) an unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain;
(b) identifiable by time and place of occurrence;
(c) identifiable by member or part of the body affected; and
(d) caused by a specific event on a single day or during a single work shift. Section 39-71-119, MCA (1993).
Thus, injuries that trigger an exclusive remedy under the Act are internal or external harm to a worker's body. The loss or impairment of a person's ability to bring an action against a third party for spoliation of evidence is not an injury covered by the Act.
Accordingly, we hold that an employee's claim against his employer for spoliation of evidence is not barred by the Act's exclusivity provisions. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court erred when it determined that the Olivers were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act from bringing a negligence action against Mr. Oliver's employer and/or his employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier.
ISSUE 2
Should Montana adopt the torts of negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence as independent causes of action?
As previously stated, the District Court concluded that it need not reach the question of whether the torts of intentional or negligent spoliation of evidence should be recognized in Montana. The District Court held that the Defendants did not engage in the type of conduct that could give rise to intentional spoliation of evidence. The court further concluded that given the relationship of the parties
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