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Bowden v. Commissioner12/21/1999
575 A.2d at 1286. We indicated, however, that a statute "tailored to protect the interests of communities when they have no notice of a problem or when they have inadequate opportunity to respond to a known problem may meet constitutional requirements." Id.
In apparent response to our decision in City of Dover, the senate drafted legislation limiting municipal liability and asked for our opinion on the constitutionality of the proposed legislation. See Opinion of the Justices, 134 N.H. 266, 592 A.2d 180 (1991). We responded that the proposed statute limiting municipal liability to instances where the municipality had received actual notice of an insufficiency or defect in roadways or sidewalks, but failed to take corrective action, facially survived constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 275-76, 592 A.2d at 185-86. The general court then adopted that standard for both municipal liability, see Laws 1991, ch. 385 (codified at RSA 231:90-:92 (1993)), and State liability, see Laws 1992, ch. 188 (codified at RSA 230:78-:80). In adopting the latter statute, the general court noted that
highways . . . unlike other property interests, are open to constant unsupervised public use, subject to interruption only in limited circumstances; that their condition for public use is subject to the ever-changing, unpredictable effects of sun, rain, wind, ice, snow and frost, . . . and that the existing construction standard or state of repair of any highway . . . is a product of its unique history of capital investments, made at different times, in response to differing and evolving needs of the traveling public. It is, therefore, unreasonable to expect that all highways . . . will be routinely patrolled or subject to regular preventative maintenance, or that all such highways . . . should be constructed and maintained to any uniform standards. Laws 1992, 188:1.
We hold that the requirements of actual notice and the standard for the State's duty before liability may be imposed as expressed in RSA 230:78-:80 are constitutional. See Opinion of the Justices, 134 N.H. at 275-76, 592 A.2d at 185-86; City of Dover, 133 N.H. at 120, 575 A.2d at 1286.
Next, we address whether the trial court erroneously held the plaintiffs to a standard of pleading higher than generally required under our common law. In Morency, 96 N.H. at 345-46, 76 A.2d at 792, we held that
leadings ought to be simple, concise and indicate the theory on which the plaintiff is proceeding so that the opposing party can adequately defend. The defendant is entitled to be informed of the theory on which the plaintiffs are proceeding and the redress that they claim as a result of the defendant's actions.
In the instant case, to determine whether the pleadings satisfy this standard, we must review them in light of the applicable law and our standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we assume the truth of the facts alleged in the plaintiff's pleadings and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him. If the facts pled do not constitute a basis for legal relief, we will uphold the granting of the motion to dismiss. Buckingham v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 142 N.H. 822, 825, 713 A.2d 381, 383 (1998) (quotation and citation omitted). To determine whether the pleadings state a claim upon which relief could be granted, we ask whether the plaintiffs established a prima facie case for State liability for highway defects as defined in RSA 230:78-:80. RSA 230:78 provides:
I. Whenever any class I or class II highway or highway bridge in the state shall be insufficient,
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