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Gold v. United Health Services Hospitals12/9/1999
aker was decided prior to the enactment of Social Services Law § 366(4)(h)(1) and § 367-a (2)(b), which statutes address, inter alia, eligibility for medical assistance and reimbursement from liable third parties. Although the facts of the case at bar and Baker are similar inasmuch as both plaintiffs were under the age of 21, the limitations of Social Services Law § 104(2) are not controlling in the instant case since the assignment, subrogation and recoupment rights derive not from the general provisions of Social Services Law § 104, but from Social Services Law § 366(4)(h)(1) and § 367-a (2)(b). Neither of these statutes contains a provision manifesting an intent to treat infants differently from adult medical assistance recipients regarding the recoupment of expenditures made for their care. Although the liens, as vehicles for the recovery of public moneys expended, were initiated in accordance with Social Services Law § 104-b, that statute is a "purely procedural" mechanism providing an alternative to the commencement of a direct action (see, Calvanese v. Calvanese, supra, at 117; Cricchio v. Pennisi, 90 NY2d 296, 306; Baker v. Sterling, supra, at 405).
Furthermore, the Baker court recognized that "the scope of the remedy is governed by the terms of the statute creating the right" (Baker v. Sterling, supra, at 405), and the subrogation and recoupment authority now sought to be enforced emanates from statutes other than that which the Baker court relied upon. As we find no basis to depart from the holdings of Calvanese and Cricchio v. Pennisi (supra ) in connection with lien recovery against the proceeds of a settlement for the benefit of an infant from a responsible third party as authorized under Social Services Law § 366(4)(h)(1) and § 367-a (2)(b), Supreme Court was correct in deeming the entire settlement amount available to satisfy the Medicaid liens (but see, Matter of Thurston v. Durose, 76 NY2d 683, 686-687).
We next consider whether Supreme Court erred when it determined that $2,173,625.83 from the settlement proceeds was to be reserved to provide for the infant's future custodial and medical care. Plaintiffs argue that after satisfaction of the liens and distributions for counsel fees and disbursements, the remaining funds should have been allocated to a supplemental needs trust, insulated from Medicaid repayment until the death of the recipient. CPLR 1206 grants the court discretionary power to distribute an infant's settlement funds to his or her guardian for the "use and benefit of infant", and provides the court with the authority to order the disposition of the proceeds. We find that this discretionary power is not restricted or qualified by any of the applicable statutes and, therefore, Supreme Court's finding as to the allocation of the infant's settlement funds should not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is extant. As Supreme Court's use of the jury's allocation of damages in determining the proportionate future custodial and medical care component of the settlement, i.e., 86.6% of the present total value verdict attributable to future care of the infant, was reasonable and consistent with the Court of Appeals' analysis of legislative intent (see, Cricchio v. Pennisi, supra, at 308), Supreme Court's allocation of $2,173,625.83 to future care and $336,334.71 to a supplemental needs trust was not an abuse of discretion.
Mercure, J.P., Peters, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur.
_ ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.
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