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Supreme Court12/20/1999
Argued - November 19, 1999
OPINION OF THE COURT
In an action pursuant to General Municipal Law §205-a to recover damages for wrongful death, etc., the defendant, City of New York, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Steinhardt, J.), dated June 30, 1998, which, inter alia, granted the motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment on the issue of liability and denied its cross motion to dismiss the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, the cross motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
In January 1976 firefighter Joseph Kenavan and four other firefighters were fighting a fire in an abandoned car that was parked on the street when they were struck by an oncoming vehicle. Kenavan's injuries were fatal (Kenavan v City of New York, 120 AD2d 24, 26) (hereinafter Kenavan I). In June 1997 the driver of the vehicle that struck Kenavan and the other firefighters was convicted of manslaughter and assault (see, People v Gardell, 59 AD2d 929).
Kenavan's widow and the other injured firefighters commenced a civil action against the City of New York (hererinafter the City) and the driver of the offending vehicle, asserting common law claims and a cause of action pursuant to General Municipal Law §205-a, based on violations of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1224, Administrative Code of the City of New York (ch 31) §755 - 3.0, and General Order No. 5 of the New York City Department of Sanitation. The matter was tried and the jury, inter alia, found that the City was liable under General Municipal Law §205-a for violations of the predicate statutes and regulations and that those violations were a direct or indirect cause of the occurrence (see, Kenavan v City of New York, supra).
On the appeal from the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, we reversed, explaining that the predicates for the cause of action based on General Municipal Law §205-a were "not fire preventive in nature and the violations thereof were not practically or reasonably connected to the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs" and that the General Municipal Law §205-a cause of action "should not have been submitted to the jury" (Kenavan v City of New York, supra, at 33). While the Court of Appeals affirmed (see, Kenavan v City of New York, 70 NY2d 558), it rejected as "too restrictive" our conclusion that the predicate for the General Municipal Law §205-a cause of action had to be fire preventive in nature. The Court of Appeals held that the scope of General Municipal Law §205-a was "limited to property owners and the maintenance of premises in a safe condition for firefighters" (Kenavan v City of New York, 70 NY2d, supra, at 566).
In October 1996, the Legislature amended General Municipal Law §205-a to eliminate the requirement that a cause of action under the statute was "limited to violations pertaining to the safe maintenance and control of premises" (L 1996, ch 703, §3), and to provide for the revival of claims which had been pending on or after January 1, 1987, that had been dismissed because the right to recover under the statute had been limited to premises-related violations (see, L 1996, ch 703, §4).
In April 1997 Regina Kenavan, as administrator of her husband's estate and individually (hereinafter the plaintiff), commenced this action against the City of New York, alleging a cause of action pursuant to General Municipal Law §205-a based on violations of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1224, Administrative Code of the City of New York (ch. 31), §755 -3.0, and General Order No. 5 of the New York City Department of Sanitation. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summ
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