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Supreme Court12/20/1999
ary judgment, reinstated the original jury verdict on the issue of liability and directed a trial on the issue of damages (see, Kenavan v City of New York, 177 Misc 2d 647). The City's cross motion for a directed verdict dismissing the complaint was denied (see, Kenavan v City of New York, 177 Misc 2d 647, supra).
The Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment reinstating the jury verdict. In order to establish a prima facie case under General Municipal Law §205-a, the plaintiff, in addition to demonstrating a violation of the relevant statute, ordinance, or regulation, must also establish a practical or reasonable connection between the violation and the injury or death of a firefighter (see, Cotter v Spear, 139 AD2d 555, 557; see also, Mullen v Zoebe, Inc., 86 NY2d 135, 140; Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., 85 NY2d 423, 441; McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 AD2d 186, 195, affd 20 NY2d 921).
As we explained in Kenavan I, Vehicle and Traffic Law §1224, Administrative Code of the City of New York (ch. 31) §755 -3.0, and General Order No. 5 of the New York City Department of Sanitation "were clearly enacted and promulgated in order to enable the city to take title to abandoned cars for the limited purpose of removing these cars from the streets where they are eyesores, and, after giving proper notice, to sell the abandoned cars, without incurring any liability to the true owners of those cars" (Kenavan v City of New York, 120 AD2d 24, supra, at 33, citing 1969 NY Legis Ann, at 465- 466). Here, the fatal injuries sustained by Kenavan did not result from the City's failure to remove the abandoned vehicle but rather from Kenavan being struck by a vehicle operated by a driver who was found criminally responsible for his conduct in causing the accident. Thus, assuming that any of the various provisions that served as the predicates for the plaintiff's General Municipal Law §205-a cause of action did impose an affirmative statutory duty on the City to remove abandoned vehicles from the streets (see, Gonzalez v Iocovello, 93 NY2d 539; Desmond v City of New York, 88 NY2d 455; St. Jacques v City of New York, 88 NY2d 920), it remains that under the circumstances, the requisite causal connection between the alleged violations of the statutes and regulations relied on and Kenavan's injuries is absent (see, e.g., Morales v City of New York, 70 NY2d 981; Dillon v City of New York, 238 AD2d 302; Patsos v Suffolk Charles Assocs., 226 AD2d 608; Jantzen v Edelman of N.Y., 221 AD2d 594; Billups v Wickers, 205 AD2d 723; Daggett v Keshner, 284 App Div 733, judgment affd on subsequent appeal 6 AD2d 503, affd 7 NY2d 981). While the harm might not have occurred had the City removed the abandoned vehicle from the street before it caught or was set on fire, it cannot be said that the City's failure to remove the subject vehicle bears a practical or reasonable causal connection to the injuries sustained.
S. MILLER, J.P., THOMPSON, H. MILLER, and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.
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