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Cruze v. Ford Motor Company12/16/1999
these facts and should not have been charged to the jury. The 10th Cir. has ruled, based on a similar Kansas statute, that if the FMv.S does not cover the allegedly defective component, then the manufacturers' compliance with the standard does not entitle them to the rebuttable presumption. Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996).
Further, Cruze argues that, in Tennessee, legislative history shows that the "Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978" creates liability on the part of the manufacturer, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105(a) when the product is defective OR unreasonably dangerous, which is an intended departure by our legislature from the 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts rule requiring both defect and unreasonably dangerous. Ray v. Bic Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tenn. 1996). Cruze contends that her claim as shown by the proof was that the air bag was defective, and a jury charge about a rebuttable presumption that the air bag was not unreasonably dangerous was not appropriate.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105(a) does provide for liability on the part of a manufacturer where the product is either defective or unreasonably dangerous. It does not require both. Cruze withdrew her claim that Ford's product was unreasonably dangerous. The jury was not faced with the task of deciding, based upon the evidence before them, whether or not Ford's product was unreasonably dangerous. Ford's requested instruction that compliance with the government standards by Ford's vehicle created a rebuttable presumption that the vehicle was not unreasonably dangerous was related to an issue that did not go to the jury. The Tennessee Legislature has determined that under Tennessee product law, recovery is available for defective products or for unreasonably dangerous products. A product need not satisfy both criteria in this state. Ford's requested jury instruction would have improperly negated this legislatively enacted standard.
The jury did not have the issue of whether or not the Ford Escort was unreasonably dangerous submitted to it. The failure of the Trial Court to issue Ford's requested jury instructions concerning compliance with government safety standards was not error. Ford's third issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for such further proceedings, if any, as may be required, consistent with this Opinion, and for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against Ford.
D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J.
CONCUR: HERSHEL P. FRANKS, J. CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J.
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