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Johnson v. Downing12/15/1999
n. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. There is no dispute of material facts as to the issue presented for review. Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness regarding a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622. Therefore, our review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo on the record before this Court. Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997).
Johnson contends that the doctrines of inconsistent verdict, collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply in the instant case. Johnson asserts that the parties in this case are not identical to the parties in Downing v. City of Memphis. In that suit Johnson was sued along with the City of Memphis by Downing, but was dismissed as immune. Johnson argues that she is not in privity of estate or of contract with the defendant, the City of Memphis, as she is not an executor, administrator, donor or donee, lessor or lessee.
Johnson further asserts that her rights and those of the City of Memphis are not the same. The rights of the City of Memphis, as a governmental entity, include the right to a bench trial. Johnson is entitled to a trial by jury, a right secured by the Tennessee Constitution , which she demanded and has never waived.
In summary, Johnson argues that the prior decision by the a trial Judge, hearing only the facts of the prior case pertaining to liability of the City of Memphis, should not bar her from having her day in court.
Downing contends that Johnson's status as a city employee was dispositive of Downing's claim against her in the prior action and that her status of city employee, remains with her in this action. Downing contends that since Johnson was found immune and dismissed from the suit in which her employer was held liable based on a finding of her negligence of more than fifty (50%) percent, the issue of her fault is precluded from relitigation under Tennessee comparative fault law. Downing argues that the trial court correctly granted his motion for summary judgment, holding that the prior finding of Johnson's fault " is res judicata as to the claim of Lezley Johnson against Kenneth Downing".
The Tennessee Supreme Court stated in Cole v. Arnold, 545 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tenn. 1977):
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, which is an extension of the principle of Res judicata, is applicable only where it affirmatively appears that the issue involved in the case under consideration has already been litigated in a prior suit between the same parties.
Collateral estoppel is asserted to prevent relitigation of identical issues that have been necessarily determined in a prior action between the parties or their privies. Blue diamond Coal Co. v. Holland-Am. Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn 1984). The doctrine may be invoked even in cases where the cause of action is different from the prior cause of action, Dickerson v. Godfrey, 825 S.W. 2d 692, 694 (Tenn. 1992), as long as the determination of the issue was necessary to support the judgment. Shelley v. Gipson, 200 Tenn. 1, 400 S.W. 2d 709,714 (Tenn. 1966). The burden of proof lies on the party seeking to invoke the doctrine, Dickerson v. Goodfrey, 825 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tenn. 1995), and requires that the party successfully demonstrate:
1. that the issue sought to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the earlier suit;
2. that the issue sought to be precluded
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