 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Johnson v. Downing12/15/1999
was actually litigated and decided on its merits in the earlier suit;
3. that the judgment in the earlier suit has become final;
4. that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or is in privity with a party to the earlier suit; and
5. that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity in the earlier suit to litigate the issue now sought to be precluded. Beaty v. McGraw, No. 01A01-9701-CV-00046 at *4, 1998 WL 855516 (Tenn. App. 1998) (citations omitted).
We agree with the Appellee that the issue sought to be precluded here is the same issue that was decided on the merits by the final order in the previous action. However, we find that the fourth and fifth criteria enumerated by the Beaty court are not met. We find that the requisite privity does not exist between the Appellant and her employer for the application of collateral estoppel. We further find that Appellant did not receive a full and fair opportunity to represent her interests in the issue that Downing seeks to preclude. Our reasoning set forth below is based on the failure of the facts of the case at bar to meet the requirements for the application of collateral estoppel. The roles of the parties, a lack of privity and a lack of shared interest between the Appellant and her employer were decisive in reaching our conclusions.
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the general rule set forth by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section, in Booth v. Kirk, 381 S.W.2d 312 (Tenn. App. 1964), concerning the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to negligence actions stating:
judgment for a plaintiff is not conclusive, as to issues of negligence or contributory negligence, in a subsequent action growing out of the same accident by a different plaintiff against the same defendant. Cole v. Arnold, 545 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tenn. 1977).
As the Cole Court noted, the roles of parties in a prior suit can be decisive in the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In Fourakre v. Perry, 667 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. App. 1983), a wrongful death action was brought for the death of the plaintiff's wife that resulted from an automobile accident with a state trooper. In an interlocutory appeal filed after the state trooper's motion to dismiss was denied, the Court of Appeals held that a prior judgment for the State in an action before the Board of Claims based on the trooper's negligence barred the plaintiff from asserting the trooper's negligence in a later action filed in Circuit Court. Fourakre, 667 S.W.2d 488.
The Fourakre Court also found the plaintiff had waived jury trial by "participation in the non-jury proceeding before the Board of Claims". Id. at 489. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion stating "where the discharge of the master was expressly based upon the failure to prove negligence of the servant, then the plaintiff is not privileged to relitigate the issue of negligence of the servant in a subsequent proceeding." Id. at 487.
However, in discussing its holding the Fourakre court noted:
there is no "mutuality of estoppel" in that the state trooper who was not a party to the action before the Board of Claims (indeed could not be) cannot be estopped by the action of the Board because he had no opportunity to litigate any issue before the Board. The trooper invokes estoppel against the plaintiff herein because he (the plaintiff) was a party with opportunity to litigate before the board the identical issue in the present case, i. e. the negligence of the trooper. Id. at 488.
That court clarif
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|