 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Johnson v. Downing12/15/1999
nce, because the judgment was not adverse to him, and since, also, he was not a party. It might be said that he could have filed a counterclaim by way of intervention in the suit against his employer, but if he had, he would have then had two suits pending -- one in the state court and one in the federal court for the same cause of action seeking the same damages.
We think that Shelley should have an opportunity to try his case as a plaintiff in the Circuit Court for Franklin County where the suit is now pending. Id. at 715.
In Leathers v. USA Trucking, Inc., No. 02A01-9109-CV-00198, 1992 WL 37146 (Tenn. App. 1992), this Court considered a case involving issues similar to the case at bar. Leathers was involved in a vehicle accident with defendant Young, an employee of USA Trucking, Inc. USA owned the vehicle driven by Young. Leathers's employer, Gibson Electric Membership Corporation, sued Young and USA Trucking for property damage to its truck and recovered a judgment against Young and USA Trucking for the property damage. Leathers subsequently sued Young and USA Trucking for his personal injuries and asserted in his complaint that the defendants were collateral estopped from relitigating the issue of liability because of the previous judgment rendered against them in favor of Leathers's employer. The trial court sustained Leathers's use of collateral estoppel in this situation, and this Court granted an interlocutory appeal on that issue. The Court found that the privity asserted is analogous to the relationship found in Shelley and stated:
When GEMC sued U.S.A. Trucking, GEMC was not representing the interests of Leathers, but rather was attempting to recover for its own property damages. In the present suit, the Leatherses are asserting their interests in damages for personal injuries, which are immaterial to the interests litigated by GEMC. Id. at 4.
We find that privity does not exist between Johnson and the City of Memphis to support claim preclusion through the application of collateral estoppel. Johnson's interest in the subject matter, a claim for personal injuries, was not represented by the City of Memphis in the previous action. Barring Johnson's claim against Downing would preclude her from the opportunity to litigate the issue of negligence where she was not a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior action. Preclusion of her claim would also violate her right to a jury trial protected by the Tennessee Constitution. It is clear from the order of the trial court that the City of Memphis's refusal to consolidate the cases, and try both in one proceeding before one judge and one jury, effectively denied Johnson her constitutional right to a jury trial.
We agree with the Appellant that should the trial court find different degrees of fault, this would not create inconsistent verdicts.
Accordingly we reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment and remand this case for trial. Costs of the appeal are assessed against Appellee.
W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.
CONCUR:
DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE
ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|