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State v. Adams12/20/1999
opinion as to the Defendant's culpable mental state. Though the Defendant was not cooperative, Dr. Craddock and his team were able to observe the Defendant and evaluate his mental state. They diagnosed the Defendant as depressed. While Dr. Craddock agreed with Dr. Schleicher that the Defendant "tends to be impulsive" and that "he is somewhat suspicious of other's intentions," he "did not see the symptoms worthy of a personality disorder." He gave his opinion that at the time of the stabbing, the Defendant did have the capacity to premeditate and to act in an intentional, knowing fashion.
I.
The Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he argues that an element of aggravated assault, that the defendant knowingly placed the victim in fear of imminent bodily injury , was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to one of the victims, Shanta Lewis. He also argues that the culpable mental state of "knowing," which is required for a conviction of attempted second degree murder, was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, he contends that as to the aggravated burglary, the essential element that the defendant acted recklessly regarding whether he had the victim's effective consent to enter her residence was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e) prescribes that " indings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). Evidence is sufficient if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In addition, because conviction by a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption of guilt, a convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient. McBee v. State, 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963); see also State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992) (citing State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1976), and State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977)); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); Holt v. State, 357 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tenn. 1962).
In its review of the evidence, an appellate court must afford the State "the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914 (citing State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)). The court may not "re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence" in the record below. Evans, 838 S.W.2d at 191 (citing Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d at 836). Likewise, should the reviewing court find particular conflicts in the trial testimony, the court must resolve them in favor of the jury verdict or trial court judgment. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914.
To prove that the Defendant committed an aggravated assault on Shanta Lewis, the State was required to prove that the Defendant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused Shanta Lewis to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury and (2) that he used or displayed a deadly weapon. See Tenn. Code Ann. ยงยง 39-13-101(a)(2), -102(a)(1)(B). Though it is not disputed that the Defendant used a deadly weapon, the Defendant argues that the State did not prove he intentionally or knowingly caused Shanta Lewis to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury. He points out that Shanta Lewis never testified she was afraid of the Defendant and that the Defendant's actions were directed to
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