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State v. Adams12/20/1999
wards Linda Lewis, not Shanta Lewis. The Defendant then concludes that there was no proof that he knowingly placed Shanta Lewis in fear.
In proving the existence of an assault, " he element of `fear' is satisfied if the circumstances of the incident, within reason and common experience, are of such a nature as to cause a person to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury . Thus, the apprehension of imminent bodily harm may be inferred . . . ." State v. Gregory Whitfield, C.C.A. No. 02C01- 9706-CR-00226, 1998 WL 227776, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, May 8, 1998) (citation omitted). While Shanta Lewis did not specifically testify that she was afraid, her fear can be inferred from the circumstances of the incident. She testified that she came down the stairs and saw the Defendant standing over her mother. She screamed "don't kill my momma" and pushed the Defendant away. At that point, she saw that he had a knife. The Defendant retreated to the kitchen and then came back into the room. Ms. Lewis testified that "he took me over" and stabbed her mother again. Under these circumstances, a rational juror could infer that Shanta Lewis was in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury to herself, as well as to her mother.
The Defendant further argues that the State did not prove he knowingly placed Shanta Lewis in fear because the proof shows that his attack was directed towards Linda Lewis, not Shanta Lewis. "A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person's conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(b). Knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Poag v. State, 567 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). The evidence here established that the Defendant stabbed Linda Lewis with a knife. Shanta Lewis pushed the Defendant away and the Defendant retreated to the kitchen. Still armed with a knife, the Defendant returned, moved Shanta Lewis out of the way, and stabbed Linda Lewis again. This circumstantial proof shows the Defendant was aware of Shanta Lewis' presence, and a reasonable juror could infer from this evidence that the Defendant was also aware that his conduct in approaching Shanta Lewis with a knife and moving her out of the way so he could stab her mother again was reasonably certain to cause her to fear imminent bodily injury . Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
The Defendant further argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for attempted second degree murder. Second degree murder is " knowing killing of another." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). Thus, before the Defendant could be convicted of attempted second degree murder, the State had to prove that the Defendant attempted to kill Linda Lewis and that he was aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the death of Linda Lewis. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-302(b), 39-12-101(a), 39-13-210(a)(1). The Defendant argues that his conduct was not reasonably certain to cause death. In support of his argument, he states that there was no testimony indicating that Linda Lewis' stab wounds were potentially fatal and that testimony conflicted as to whether the Defendant told Ms. Lewis, "I told you I'd kill you," or, "Next time I'll kill you."
Whether Ms. Lewis' injuries were actually life-threatening is irrelevant. As this Court has recognized, the "victim of an attempted murder does not necessarily suffer particularly great personal injuries." State v. Harris, 978 S.W.2d 109, 117 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). What is important is whether the conduct of stabbing a person is reasonably certain to cause death. Regardless of whether the Defendant said, "I told you I'd k
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