 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Bricker v. Jackpot Convenience Stores12/17/1999
s v. Niobrara County Mem'l Hosp., 128 F.3d 1351, 1356 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, U.S. , 118 S. Ct. 1515, 140 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1998); see also Nielson, 95 Wn. App. at 578 (observing that, "{t}o establish constructive discharge, the employee must first show a deliberate act by the employer that made his working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign" (emphasis added)). The "intolerable conditions" Bricker cites would not cause a reasonable person to resign.
We affirm the trial court's finding no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bricker was constructively terminated. As a matter of law, Bricker was not terminated, either directly or constructively. Thus, summary judgment was appropriate as to Bricker's termination claims.
IV. Wrongful Transfer
Bricker argues that if he was not wrongfully terminated, he was wrongfully transferred in violation of public policy. But in White v. State, 131 Wn.2d 1, 929 P.2d 396 (1997), the Supreme Court rejected such a cause of action:
Generally, other jurisdictions share the same concern as the Court of Appeals in this case, that recognizing a cause of action for wrongful disciplinary action less than discharge has the potential to expand and to generate frivolous clams. Ludwig {v. C & A Wallcoverings, Inc., 960 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Illinois law)}; Mintz {v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 183 Ariz. 550, 905 P.2d 559, 562 (Ct. App. 1995)}; White {v. State, 78 Wn. App. 824, 839, 898 P.2d 331 (1995)}. In White, the Court of Appeals reasoned that by recognizing a cause of action for employer actions short of an actual discharge, the court would be opening a floodgate to frivolous litigation and substantially interfering with an employer's discretion to make personnel decisions. White, 78 Wn. App. at 839-40. White, 131 Wn.2d at 19.
Bricker attempts to distinguish White on the ground that it involved public, rather than private, employment. But the Supreme Court observed: Subjecting each disciplinary decision of an employer to the scrutiny of the judiciary would not strike the proper balance between the employer's right to run his business as he sees fit and the employee's right to job security.
White, 131 Wn.2d at 20. "'{C}courts are ill-equipped to act as super personnel agencies.'" White, 131 Wn.2d at 19-20 (quoting White, 78 Wn. App. at 840). No cause of action for wrongful transfer in private employment has been recognized in this state and we decline Bricker's invitation to establish one here.
In light of our affirmance of summary judgment, we need not reach the remaining issues. Even taken in the light most favorable to Bricker, the facts do not support his claims of: (1) retaliation for objecting to the violation of FIPA; (2) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; (3) retaliation for seeking benefits under the worker's compensation laws or the FMLA; and (4) disability discrimination.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Hunt, J.
We concur:
Bridgewater, C.J.
Armstrong, J.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Washington Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|