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State v. Sims11/29/1999
air and orderly conduct of the trial. In all these respects he must have broad discretion. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1975).
But the Herring court also recognized that closing argument is a crucial aspect of advocacy in our adversarial criminal Justice system, and for the defense, it is "the last clear chance to persuade the trier of fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." 422 U.S. at 862.
In its wide discretion to determine the time allotted for argument, the trial court may consider, among other factors, "the length of the trial, the number of witnesses called, {and} the nature and character of the evidence submitted." State v. Willis, 37 Wn.2d 274, 280, 223 P.2d 453 (1950). Because the Willis court reversed on other grounds, it declined to address whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting defense counsel to 30 minutes of argument in a trial for burglary but commented that in its opinion the allotted time for argument was too limited. See id. at 280-81. But in a grand larceny case that was "not particularly complicated, either from the standpoint of the state or the defense," the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting each defendant to 20 minutes or a total of one hour for all the defendants. State v. Jack, 63 Wn.2d 632, 638-39, 388 P.2d 566 (1964). See also State v. Cecotti, 31 Wn. App. 179, 183, 639 P.2d 243 (1982) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting defense argument to 30 minutes in a trial that lasted less than two and one-half days and the defendant did not identify any issues he was not permitted to address).
Here, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Umi was charged with first degree murder and the trial lasted five weeks. Umi's defense counsel requested 90 minutes for argument. He was allowed to argue for 64 minutes. Although defense counsel objected on the record following closing that he did not have time to address jury instructions or refute certain statements made by the prosecutor, he presented a thorough argument in his allotted 64 minutes.
G. Cumulative Error Does Not Require Reversal
"It is well accepted that reversal may be required due to the cumulative effects of trial court errors, even if each error examined on its own would otherwise be considered harmless." See State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 93, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). Cumulative error does not require reversal here.
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES PERTAINING TO MOSI
A. Drawing All Inferences in Favor of the State, the Evidence is Sufficient to Convict Mosi of Manslaughter
Mosi argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that he committed first degree manslaughter because the State failed to show that Mosi's conduct recklessly caused Henderson's death. He argues that the evidence showed that Umi acted alone in shooting Henderson and in causing his death. Apparently conceding that the State failed at trial to prove that Mosi was guilty of manslaughter in the first degree as a principal, the State argues on appeal only that sufficient evidence supports a conviction on manslaughter in the first degree based on Mosi's accomplice liability to his brother's second degree felony murder. In response, Mosi argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that Mosi acted as an accomplice, asserting that Mosi did not know that Umi brought a gun to the fight.
The accomplice statute states, in part:
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if:
(a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission
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