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HILDEBRANDT v. CITY OF FAIRBANKS5/1/1998
tly egregious may lead to § 1983 liability." Lewis, 98 F.3d at 444.
Hildebrandt reasons that Williamson's conduct was so egregious as to shock the conscience. Although other jurisdictions have sometimes applied other standards, the parties to this case have addressed only the
"shock the conscience" test. The superior court concluded that "an individual police officer may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the officer's conduct `shocks the conscience,'" and found that Williamson's actions did not satisfy that standard.
The superior court found that Williamson violated the Fairbanks Police Department's Standard Operating Procedure in several respects. Williamson "was negligent in failing to drive with regard for the safety of other persons," in failing to terminate pursuit once he knew Malone's identity, and in failing to maintain radio contact with his supervisor. The superior court found that, when Williamson entered the intersection, his emergency lights and siren were activated, but he "failed to use extreme caution when entering and going through [the intersection]." Hildebrandt argues that Williamson was traveling at about 45 miles per hour when he entered the intersection.
We must decide, then, whether Williamson's transgressions shock the conscience. Governmental conduct that "offend . . . canons of decency and fairness" or violates personal immunities that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" may "shock the conscience" and thus violate one's due process rights. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-72, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (quotations omitted).
Courts that have applied the Rochin standard to highspeed police pursuits have found that conduct more egregious than Williamson's did not shock the conscience. In Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1991), for instance, a police officer engaged in a chase for ten miles at night along a two-lane highway near a busy carnival at speeds ranging from 65 to 105 miles per hour. Id. at 718, 723. The pursued motorist was suspected of stealing $17 worth of gas. Id. The police officer lost control of his car and hit the plaintiff's car broadside at approximately 60 miles per hour, inflicting "severe and permanent injuries" on the plaintiff. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the officer's conduct, "while disturbing and lacking in judgment, [fell] short of the `shocks the conscience' standard." Id. at 723.
The Eighth Circuit considered a highspeed chase in which a police officer pursued a suspect outside the officer's jurisdiction. Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 295 (8th Cir. 1989). The suspect collided with an oncoming car, and the police car then collided with the debris from the first accident. Id. The two collisions caused the death of the suspect and injured two innocent persons in the oncoming car, as well as a passenger in the suspect's car. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the officer's conduct "shock the conscience." Id. at 297. The Eighth Circuit held that the officer's conduct was not grossly negligent and "most certainly not rise to the level of conduct which would sustain a claim under section 1983." Id. at 297. Thus, conduct during vehicle pursuits involving higher speeds than those claimed here, more serious harm, and more dangerous conditions has been held not to shock the conscience.
A state official's negligent conduct does not implicate the Due Process Clause. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). The Fourteenth Amendment is not "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States."
Paul v. Davis
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