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Revere v. Canulette5/15/1998
entitled "MOTION TO OBJECT TO CONSOLIDATION Ä AND OBJECTION TO IMPROPER NOTIFICATION AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE." In the pleading, plaintiff argued that consolidation was improper because a final judgment had been rendered in civil docket number 94-13866-E and the defendant had not taken an appeal from that judgment. Plaintiff also argued that he had not been served with the motion to consolidate and was not given an opportunity to be heard prior to the consolidation. Plaintiff urges this argument again on appeal.
The peremptory exception of res judicata may be pleaded at any stage in the proceeding in the trial court prior to a submission of the case for a decision. La. C.C.P. art. 928(B). Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 865, we are required to construe every pleading as to do substantial Justice. Fox v. National Gypsum, Inc., 96-25 (La. App. 5th Cir. 4/30/96), 673 So.2d 1223, 1227. Although plaintiff's pleading is not labeled as an exception of res judicata, we conclude that the exception of res judicata was sufficiently raised before the trial court in plaintiff's objection to the consolidation.
We next turn to the question of whether the trial court should have sustained the exception of res judicata. A contradictory hearing was held on February 13, 1995. The trial court rendered a judgment in the matter on February 22, 1995, granting plaintiff's request for access to the public records. This constituted a decision on the merits and was a final judgment. Moreover, this court recognized the judgment as a final, appealable judgment in its denial of plaintiff's writ application regarding the plaintiff's motion for new trial. See Revere v. James, 95-0991 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/2/95). Therefore, we conclude that the consolidation of civil docket number 94-13866-E was improper because the matter became final when no appeal was taken from the February 22, 1995 judgment.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
Plaintiff next argues that La.R.S. 44:31.1, which was enacted by 1995 La. Acts No. 653, and which became effective August 15, 1995, is substantive in nature. Thus, according to plaintiff, La.R.S. 44:31.1 should not be applied retroactively to the actions that he filed prior to the statute's August 15, 1995 effective date.
The general rule regarding retroactivity of laws is codified in La. C.C. art. 6, which provides as follows:
In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.
Although La.R.S. 1:2, which provides that " o section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated," appears to conflict with La. C.C. art. 6 La.R.S. 1:2 has been limited to apply only to substantive and not to procedural or interpretive legislation. Sudwischer v. Estate of Huffpauir, 97-0785 (La. 12/12/97), 705 So.2d 724, 728.
Accordingly, in determining whether the definition of "person" contained in La.R.S. 44:31.1 is to be applied retroactively, we must engage in the following two-part inquiry:
The first step involves determining whether the Legislature expressed an intent concerning the retroactive or prospective application of the law. If the Legislature expressed such an intent, the process is at an end and the law must be characterized as the Legislature intended. However, if no intent is expressed by the Legislature, we must discern the Legislature's intent and classify the law as either substantive, procedural, or interpretative.
Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 705 So.2d at 728; see Manuel v. Louisiana Sher
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