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Stover v. State Farm Ins. Co.5/21/1998
HADLEY, Judge.
This is an appeal of a Seneca County Common Pleas Court judgment entry both granting and dismissing the parties' relative summary judgment motions on a declaratory judgment action. For the following reasons, we affirm that decision in part and reverse it in part.
On November 14, 1986, Leo Stover was severely injured in a car accident when he collided with Melinda Shepard. Due to a brain injury , Leo was declared incompetent and his wife, Angeline ("appellee"), was granted legal guardianship of Leo.
At the time of the accident, Leo Stover had four insurance policies through State Farm Insurance Company ("appellant").
On or about October 28, 1988, Angeline, acting on Leo's behalf, sued Melinda for Leo's bodily damages. Additionally, she also sought damages for her loss of consortium.
Then, on February 28, 1990, appellee filed a voluntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Civ.R. 42(A)(1). Appellee never refiled her loss-of-consortium claim against Melinda.
On August 12, 1991, appellee and Melinda formally agreed to settle the case. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, appellee released Melinda from any further claims on behalf of Leo. Additionally, Leo received the full policy limits of $100,000 under Melinda's liability policy.
On February 9, 1994, appellee filed a declaratory judgment lawsuit against appellant seeking underinsured motorist benefits. Appellee then voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit on April 26, 1995.
On April 25, 1996, appellee refiled her declaratory judgment lawsuit. In that complaint, appellee sought to recover underinsured motorist benefits both for herself and on Leo's behalf.
On June 9, 1997, appellee filed a summary judgment motion requesting the trial court to find that she was entitled to declaratory judgment as a matter of law. Appellant responded on June 25, 1997. Additionally, appellant also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
On December 23, 1997, the trial court granted appellee's summary judgment motion on her declaratory judgment action. In its judgment entry, the trial court found that appellee was entitled to $400,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. That same day, it denied appellant's cross-motion for summary judgment.
It is from that decision appellant now appeals, with the following three assignments of error.
"The court erred in ruling that Angeline Stover is entitled to assert a claim under the underinsured motorist coverage of the State Farm policies."
We must initially decide if the December 23, 1997 judgment entry is a final appealable order. R.C. 2505.02 provides that orders affecting a substantial light in a special proceeding are final appealable orders. Declaratory judgment actions have been held to be special proceedings within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02, and, therefore, an order entered therein that affects a substantial light is a final appealable order. General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 22, 540 N.E.2d 266, 271-272.
In the present case, the record reflects that appellee filed a summary judgment motion requesting the trial court to find that she was entitled to declaratory judgment as a matter of law. When the trial court granted her motion, appellant's light to defend was affected. Therefore, we find that the order was final because it affected a substantial right in a special proceeding. See Mezerkor v. Mezerkor (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 304, 306, 638 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (holding that the granting of summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action was a final appealable or
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