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State v. Diprete5/1/1998
absence of both outrageous conduct and demonstrable and otherwise incurable prejudice. Our opinion in State v. Jackson, supra, would indicate that this Court would also hold the supervisory power within similarly narrow limits. When we refer to an exclusionary rule as strong medicine, we would certainly regard dismissal of an indictment or numerous counts thereof to constitute even stronger medicine that would necessarily rest on a constitutional, statutory, or other imperative created by a court rule rather than the inherent supervisory power.
We recognize that the trial Justice in the case at bar reached a conscientious determination that the remedy of dismissal was authorized by our opinion in Quintal. Our limiting of the holding in that case to its particular facts will serve as a guide to trial Justices in reserving the extreme and ultimate sanction of dismissal only to situations in which there has been flagrant prosecutorial misconduct accompanied by severe and incurable prejudice. During the course of the trial Justice's thirty-two-day hearing and in his comprehensive and careful findings of fact set forth in his written decision, it is apparent that he was justifiably displeased at the state's conduct of its discovery obligations. Failure to communicate effectively among the members of the Attorney General's staff, reliance upon the assumption that prior members of the prosecutorial team had conducted exhaustive searches of documents, and failure to express with full candor the knowledge of criminal conduct on the part of significant witnesses brought forth appropriate critical comment from the trial Justice.
We must bear in mind that when a grand jury returns an indictment, the people of the State of Rhode Island are entitled to have the issues of fact and the issues of guilt or innocence tried on their merits. The punishment of an errant prosecutor by dismissal of the charges is in effect a punishment imposed upon the people of this state. Only in the most extraordinary of circumstances should the people of Rhode Island be deprived of their right to a trial of these charges.
For the reasons stated, the appeal of the state is sustained. The judgment of the Superior Court dismissing twenty-two counts of the indictment is hereby vacated. The case is remanded to the Superior Court for trial on the merits.
Justices Flanders and Goldberg recused themselves from participation in this case.
Lederberg, Justice, Concurring in part and Dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority in remanding this case for a trial on the merits. I dissent, however, in two respects. First, it is my opinion that the majority has erred by "not [reviewing] this order under an abuse of discretion standard;" second, the majority errs in failing to impose sanctions for what both the majority and the Dissent agree were flagrant abuses of the discovery process.
I disagree with the majority's signal Conclusion that "the trial Justice did not have the authority to dismiss twenty-two counts of this indictment." (Emphasis added.) The Dissent, correctly I believe, points out that Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly grants to a trial Justice the authority to dismiss an indictment in appropriate circumstances. Rule 16(i) explicitly provides that
" f at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule, [the court] may order such party to provide the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material which or testimony of a
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