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State v. Diprete5/1/1998
e permitting such conduct to go unsanctioned. Although the resources available to defendants here were instrumental in uncovering the state's wrongdoing, most defendants are unable to engage in protracted discovery battles. "There can be no equal Justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S. Ct. 585, 591, 100 L. Ed. 891, 899 (1956) (Black, J.).
The prosecution's behavior in this case amounted to a fraud on the court that might never have been discovered but for the zealous efforts of defendants' attorneys. The trial Justice found that "the prosecutors acted deliberately with the intent to mislead the defendants and the court." At the very least, the prosecutors' conduct in this case showed a reckless disregard for the government's obligations to comply with the rules and orders of the Superior Court and "to take no steps that prevent an adversary from presenting his case fully and fairly." Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 354 (6th Cir. 1993). In Demjanjuk the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit took the unusual step of reopening a case on the court's own motion and then vacating a prior judgment on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct by attorneys of the federal government. Observing that " o court system can function without safeguards against actions that interfere with its administration of Justice," the Sixth Circuit insisted that " s an officer of the court, every attorney has a duty to be completely honest in conducting litigation." Id. at 352.
As a result of the prosecutors' misconduct, the defendants here have suffered prejudice, additional attorneys' fees, expenses in countering that misconduct, and delay in bringing their case to a resolution. Although the delay caused by the dismissals and subsequent appeal may have had a curative effect by allowing the defendants time to incorporate into their defense the materials contained in the delayed discovery, that benefit has come only at considerable cost to the defendants. The state, however, should not be permitted to benefit from the delay. Accordingly, it is my that the state should be precluded from using at trial any evidence discovered subsequent to May 16, 1996, the date on which this Court issued its order vacating the trial court's dismissal of the extortion counts. Furthermore, an award of attorneys' fees should be made to compensate the defendants for the financial burdens that they would not have borne but for the state's delay in producing the additional materials.
Justice Bourcier, Dissenting.
If for a moment I could believe that the defendants had not been irreparably prejudiced by the state's prosecutorial misconduct and could get a fair trial, I would join with my colleagues in the majority. I cannot, however, and for that reason as well as for the unconventional method chosen by my colleagues to review the state's appeal, I am unable to join in their opinion.
Until this case, in every appeal that has come to this Court challenging the imposition of a Super.R.Crim.P. 16(i) discovery violation sanction by a trial Justice, we have steadfastly held that choice of sanction is a matter that is left to the sound discretion of the trial Justice and, absent a showing by the appellant of a clear abuse of that discretion, this Court will not overturn the trial Justice's action. The majority, unable to find any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial Justice in this case, has supplanted without reason that established precedent with a new and novel "lack of authority" review rule that it says precluded the trial Justice's imposition of either of two long recognized Rule 16(i) sanctions, witness exclusion
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Rhode Island Personal Injury Attorneys
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