State v. Diprete5/1/1998
ccording to the majority's holding, will be a case continuance -- which in effect simply means that the prosecutor's game clock will have to be rewound and reset and the game replayed.
II
Proper Scope of Review in This Appeal
In every reported opinion of this Court since 1972 wherein we have reviewed a challenge to the propriety of a trial Justice's imposition of a Rule 16(i) sanction, this Court has always and unanimously held that the imposition of any sanction "'is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial Justice'" in light of the attendant circumstances of a given case and that " e will not disturb a trial Justice's action in this regard absent a clear showing that the trial justice abused his or her discretion." State v. Quintal, 479 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1984); Coelho, 454 A.2d at 245. We additionally noted in Coelho that " ithout question, the trial Justice is in the best position to determine whether any harm has resulted from noncompliance with discovery motions and whether the harm can be mitigated." Coelho, 454 A.2d at 244-45.
The only issue thus raised by the state's appeal in this case and properly before us is whether the state has proven that the trial justice in this case clearly abused his discretion in imposing the Rule 16(i) discovery sanction of case dismissal. We have never held otherwise. State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 319 (R.I. 1997); State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180, 186 (R.I. 1994); State v. LaChapelle, 638 A.2d 525, 530 (R.I. 1994); State v. Squillante 622 A.2d 474, 478 (R.I. 1993); State v. Brisson, 619 A.2d 1099, 1102 (R.I. 1993); State v. Amaral, 611 A.2d 380, 383 (R.I. 1992); State v. Sanders, 609 A.2d 963, 965 (R.I. 1992); State v. Morejon, 603 A.2d 730, 735 (R.I. 1992); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 430 (R.I. 1990); State v. Parker, 566 A.2d 1294, 1297 (R.I. 1989); State v. Bibee, 559 A.2d 618, 621 (R.I. 1989); State v. St. Jean, 554 A.2d 206, 210 (R.I. 1989); State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 1059, 1068 (R.I. 1989); State v. Padula, 551 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1988); State v. Boucher, 542 A.2d 236, 241 (R.I. 1988); State v. Dufault, 540 A.2d 355, 358 (R.I. 1988); State v. Brown, 528 A.2d 1098, 1102 (R.I. 1987); State v. Payano, 528 A.2d 721, 728 (R.I. 1987); State v. Robbio, 526 A.2d 509, 512 (R.I. 1987); State v. Lawrence, 492 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I. 1985); State v. Engram, 479 A.2d 716, 718-19 (R.I. 1984); State v. Quintal, 479 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1984); State v. Verlaque, 465 A.2d 207, 213 (R.I. 1983); State v. Tillinghast, 465 A.2d 191, 197 (R.I. 1983); State v. Concannon, 457 A.2d 1350, 1353 (R.I. 1983); State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 245 (R.I. 1982); State v. Sciarra, 448 A.2d 1215, 1218 (R.I. 1982); State v. Darcey, 442 A.2d 900, 902 (R.I. 1982); State v. Silva, 118 R.I. 408, 411, 374 A.2d 106, 108 (1977).
The majority today in this appeal, however, elects to avoid and sidestep that long-standing precedent and deftly relieves the state of its burden of proving a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial Justice. Abandoning precedent, the majority announces that it has chosen not to "test" the trial Justice's action in this appeal under an abuse of discretion standard but instead under a lack of authority standard, from which it then concludes "that the trial Justice did not have the authority to dismiss" the indictment nor the authority to even impose a witness exclusion sanction. In employing that new appellate standard of review, the majority explains that in doing so, the trial Justice's discretion is "not called into action." It then attempts to justify its new rule in a somewhat interesting, double-faceted manner that unfortunately, I believe, is infected by inherent misconception. Initially the majority app
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