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State v. Diprete5/1/1998
he defense counsel were forced, in moving for sanctions, to disclose their strategy. We think this prejudice is insufficient.
The disclosure of the defense strategy was brought about not by the delay in discovery but by defendants' voluntary actions in seeking sanctions. When the material produced in the thirty boxes plus the fruits of the Rule 17(c) subpoenas were made available to defendants, the state had provided all materials that defendants had requested. The defendants could have used these materials to prepare for trial. However, defendants chose to seek the ultimate sanction of dismissal. It was in pursuance of this goal that their strategy was disclosed. Moreover, we are of the opinion that the disclosure of this strategy was of minimal prejudice since it would be apparent to any skilled advocate that impeaching materials relating to criminal conduct and/or promises and rewards would be utilized by defendants to the greatest extent possible in cross-examination. It should also be noted that under our liberal rules of discovery, see Wyche, 518 A.2d at 910 (recognizing that Rule 16 is one of the "most liberal criminal discovery mechanisms in the United States"), defendants' strategy is no more beyond disclosure than is the strategy of the state. Trial by ambush is no longer available to either side.
Consequently we are of the opinion that the sanctions available to the trial Justice included neither that of excluding the testimony of the state's witnesses nor the ultimate sanction of dismissal. The trial justice observed in his decision that he could not be sure that all discovery had been provided even at the close of the hearing. Under the provisions of Rule 16(i) the trial Justice had ample authority to preclude any evidence that might be offered at trial that had not already been provided pursuant to the aggressive steps taken by counsel for the defense and implemented by the court.
In the event that the trial Justice was of the opinion that defendants were required to expend additional resources in order to achieve full discovery, the court might have awarded an appropriate counsel fee for such additional time as might have been spent in seeking full discovery.
However, in the circumstances of this case it is the opinion of this Court that the trial Justice did not have the authority to dismiss twenty-two counts of this indictment. We are not testing this order under an abuse-of-discretion standard. We hold to the contrary that there was an insufficient basis upon which the trial Justice could enter an order of dismissal. Therefore, his discretion in this context was not called into action. We are of the opinion that only in extraordinary circumstances such as were present in State v. Quintal would a trial Justice have the authority to dismiss an indictment for delayed discovery. Those circumstances were not present in this case.
Supervisory Power
The defendants have asserted that the Superior Court, like Federal District Courts, has an inherent supervisory power that would enable Justices of the Superior Court to take such actions as may be necessary to vindicate their authority, even though such actions may not be specifically authorized by constitution or rule. We concur with the general proposition that Justices of the Superior Court have inherent power to govern proceedings before them and to vindicate their authority by appropriate sanctions including the sanction of contempt.
However, the Supreme Court of the United States, which recognizes the supervisory authority of Federal District Courts also limits that authority within appropriate parameters. For example, in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 5
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