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DOE v. CITY OF STAMFORD5/29/1997
d the claimant's application for compensation. He found no fault with the claimant's factual representation but held that, as a matter of law, "mere exposure to infectious diseases does not give rise to a viable claim that the laimant has suffered an injury or occupational disease" under the act.
The review board affirmed the commissioner's decision. The board agreed with the commissioner that exposure to an infectious disease, without more, constitutes neither a "personal injury " nor an "occupational disease" under the act. While recognizing that principles of equity militate against the defendant's refusal to
cover the claimant's medical expenses, the review board concluded that, in the absence of statutory authorization, it could not compel the defendant to fulfill its equitable obligation. One member of the review board dissented.
On the claimant's appeal to this court, we must decide whether exposure to an infectious disease constitutes a compensable "injury" under the act. The claimant contends that, in order to effectuate the act's humanitarian purposes, "injury" cannot be defined so narrowly as to exclude a serious risk of contracting a life threatening disease. At least, he argues, the term "injury" must be construed to include exposures in circumstances under which the prevailing standard of care calls for immediate and ongoing medical monitoring and treatment. The defendant urges us to uphold the decision of the commissioner and the review board. It contends that, in the absence of either visible physical trauma or present loss of income, a claimant has not suffered a compensable injury . We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, in which the claimant concededly has sustained actual exposures to life threatening infectious diseases in incidents that arose out of and occurred in the course of his employment, the claimant has suffered compensable injuries under the act and may recover the expenses associated with reasonable medical testing and treatment.
The principles that govern our standard of review in workers' compensation appeals are well established. "The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn
from them." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 212 Conn. 441, 449, 562 A.2d 1086 (1989). Neither the review board nor this court has the power to retry facts. See Six v. Thomas O'Connor & Co., 235 Conn. 790, 798-99, 669 A.2d 1214 (1996). Where, however, the appeal involves an issue of statutory construction that has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, this court has plenary power to review the administrative decision. See Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995) (state agency not entitled to special deference when its construction of statute has not undergone previous judicial scrutiny).
Although the parties have called our attention to the public policy implications of this case, the issue presented is, at bottom, a matter of statutory construction. General Statutes § 31-294d(a) provides in relevant part that " he employer, as soon as he has knowledge of an injury, shall provide a competent physician or surgeon to attend the injured employee and, in addition, shall furnish any medical and surgical aid . . . as the physician or surgeon deems reasonable or necessary." (Emphasis added.) See also General Statutes § 31-294d(e) (if employer refuses to provide medical assistance, "the injured employee" may pursue medical assistance at employer's expense). The defendant does not disp
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