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DOE v. CITY OF STAMFORD5/29/1997
ute that the claimant's exposures to HIV and tuberculosis reasonably require both long and short term medical monitoring. The sole issue, rather, is whether these exposures constitute compensable "injuries" within the definitional boundaries of the act. We conclude that they do.
We reach this conclusion mindful both of general principles of statutory construction and of principles specifically applicable to workers' compensation law. As a general matter, " ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the
legislature." State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994). We discern that intent by looking to the statutory language, to legislative history and policy and to other legislation and common law principles. See id., 409. In appeals arising under workers' compensation law, we must resolve statutory ambiguities or lacunae in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of the act. See Hansen v. Gordon, 221 Conn. 29, 32, 602 A.2d 560 (1992). Although we recognize that, in enacting workers' compensation law, the legislature did not intend to create "a general health and benefit insurance program"; id.; we do not read the act to include limitations on eligibility for compensation for which there is no statutory basis. See Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 359, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993).
The dispositive statute in this case is General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (A), which defines the term "injury" to encompass an "accidental injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred. . . ." There is no dispute in this case that the claimant's exposures to HIV and tuberculosis may be definitely located as to time or place or that they resulted from accidental contact with infected suspects. The commissioner and the review board concluded, however, that, because the claimant had not yet contracted either disease, he had not suffered an "injury" within the meaning of § 31-275(16)(A).
Nothing in the text or the legislative history of the act supports such a limited reading of the statutory definition of "injury." See Crochiere v. Board of Education, supra, 227 Conn. 359 (§ 31-275 "uses the term `injury' without limitation"). Although actual infection may be necessary to establish an "occupational disease" as that term is defined in § 31-275 (15), the definition
of "injury" in § 31-275(16)(A) does not require a similar pathological manifestation. Indeed, it would be contrary to the humanitarian and remedial purpose of the act to infer that the legislature intended that an employee who sustains actual exposure to a potentially fatal infectious disease must await the onset of the disease before he can recover expenses associated with necessary, and possibly lifesaving, medical intervention. See Jackson Township Volunteer Fire Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Wallet), 594 A.2d 826, 828 (Pa. Commw. 1991).
The defendant raises two alternate grounds in support of the decision of the commissioner and review board. One focuses on the form of the claimant's injury and the other focuses on the extent of the injury. Neither ground is persuasive.
First, the defendant contends that the claimant has not suffered a compensable injury because his exposures
were not accompanied by a physical wound or trauma. The defendant concedes that, if, for example, the claimant's skin had been punctured by a syringe containing blood contaminated with HIV, that puncture would be sufficient to constitute an injury . The defendant contends, however, that, in the absence of similar trauma, the claimant cannot recover under the act.
The defendan
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