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DOE v. CITY OF STAMFORD5/29/1997
t's argument cannot be reconciled with the undisputed facts in this case. The parties have stipulated that the claimant's contacts with the contagious suspects were sufficient to constitute "exposures." The defendant, therefore, cannot be arguing that the contacts were not sufficiently serious to create a risk of infection. The defendant must be arguing, instead, that the claimant did not suffer an "injury" because the incidents giving rise to his exposures did not leave a mark, abrasion or other outward sign not already present. The defendant, in effect, invites us to exalt the form of the claimant's contact with the infected suspects over the substance of the claimed injury. We decline this invitation. For purposes of workers' compensation law, the injury suffered by the claimant is the exposure to potentially fatal contagious diseases. That injury is no less real or cognizable because it was not attended by puncture or abrasion. See Arkansas Dept. of Correction
v. Holybee, 46 Ark. App. 232, 235, 878 S.W.2d 420 (1994) (in case involving correction officer bitten by HIV positive inmate, claimant's injury was not merely bite wound but also risk of infection); Jackson Township Volunteer Fire Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Wallet), supra, 594 A.2d 828 (in case involving ambulance attendant who came into contact with HIV contaminated blood, claimant's "injury was the risk of infection").
Second, the defendant contends that the claimant has not suffered a compensable injury because he has not, as yet, been incapacitated or suffered any loss of income. To the extent that this argument relies on dicta in Mulligan v. F. S. Electric, 231 Conn. 529, 541, 651 A.2d 254 (1994), and cases cited therein for the proposition that " ompensation under [the a]ct is based upon incapacity loss of earning power," (internal quotation marks omitted) that dicta has been disavowed. Williams v. Best Cleaners, Inc., 237 Conn. 490, 492-93, 677 A.2d 1356 (1996). To the extent that this argument is based on the provisions of General Statutes § 31-295 (a), which provide that no compensation for total or partial disability shall be payable under the act until the injured employee misses more than three days of employment, those provisions are irrelevant to the present case. The claimant does not seek disability compensation. He seeks, rather, to recover medical expenses in connection with the testing and treatment for HIV and tuberculosis exposure. Pursuant to § 31-294d, he is entitled to these medical expenses without any showing of incapacity or disability. See also Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1284, 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 (1991) ("a compensable injury is one which causes disability or need for medical treatments"); Elliott v. Dugger,
579 So.2d 827, 830 (Fla. App. 1991) (" he fact that [workers' compensation claimant] has yet to suffer any proven disability . . . as a result of his exposure to [acquired immune deficiency syndrome] does not make his injury any less compensable").
Accordingly, in light of the undisputed factual circumstances of record, we conclude that the claimant has established, as a matter of law, that his exposures to two potentially fatal infectious diseases are compensable "injuries" under the act. Accordingly, the commissioner and the review board improperly denied him the right to recover for reasonable expenses that he incurred for medically appropriate testing and treatment.
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