TUTTLE v. WAYMENT FARMS6/17/1997
ision through an exercise of reason. Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 128 Idaho 580, 589, 917 P.2d 737, 746 (1996).
In deciding whether to grant or deny a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), the trial court is to weigh all the evidence, including the judge's own consideration of the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the verdict is supported by the evidence. Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Authority, 128 Idaho at 590, 917 P.2d at 747; Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 614, 733 P.2d 1234, 1239 (1986); Dineen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 623, 603 P.2d 575, 578 (1979). A trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or justice. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1198 (1986), citing Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967); Keyser v. Garner, 129 Idaho 112, 119, 922 P.2d 409, 416 (Ct. App. 1996). As the next step, the trial court is to consider whether a different result would follow in a retrial. Keyser, supra, 129 Idaho at 119, 922 P.2d at 416, citing Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 422, 835 P.2d 651, 657 (Ct. App. 1992).
Here, the district court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury finding of 40% negligence on the part of the plaintiff and denied the motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). After considering the evidence which had been presented to the jury, the district court stated:
The plaintiff was aware of the removal of the covers of the auger and had worked around them for some time. Further, the plaintiff was planning on leaving for the weekend and could have been trying to finish his work too quickly. Furthermore, the plaintiff was attempting to move the tube auger without help. Therefore, this court concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict and that injustice will not occur if the verdict stands.
It is evident that, having given full respect to the jury's findings, the trial judge on the entire record was not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed. See Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho at 768, 727 P.2d at 1196, quoting Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Section 2806, at 49 (1973 & Supp. 1985). We are satisfied that the trial court appropriately recognized its discretionary authority, applied the legal standards governing motions for new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), and reached its decision with an exercise of reason. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial on this basis.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) applies to motions for remittitur, additur, or a new trial on the issue of damages based upon excessive or inadequate damages. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1986). The rule applies when damages are so excessive or inadequate as to appear to be the result of partiality by the jury. Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 851, 840 P.2d 392, 395 (1992); O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 804, 810 P.2d 1082, 1090 (1991). On a motion for new trial on this ground, the trial court is to weigh the evidence and then compare the jury's award of damages to what the judge would have awarded if there were no jury. Bott, 128 Idaho at 590, 917 P.2d at 747, citing Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho at 614, 733 P.2d at 1239 (1986). If the disparity between the two awards is so great that it appears to the trial court the award was r
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