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TUTTLE v. WAYMENT FARMS6/17/1997
he analysis by the district court began with consideration of I.C. Section 6-1606. The district court found that the settlement from Wes's Inc. qualified as a collateral source, which finding in turn supported the district court's reduction of the award to Tuttle by the amount of the settlement. This analysis was incomplete, however, in that before reducing the award, it was incumbent for the district court to look to I.C. Section 6-805 which deals specifically with the effect of a release of one tortfeasor on the liability of other tortfeasors. In the face of conflicting statutes which cover the same subject matter, the more specific will prevail. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 864 P.2d 1126 (1993); State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 861 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1993). Only if the conditions of I.C. Section 6-805 are met with respect to the contents of the release is any reduction of the award authorized.
Under I.C. Section 6-805(2), any reduction of the claim against another tortfeasor (who is not a joint tortfeasor under I.C. Section 6-803) must be expressly provided for in the release to the settling defendant. The district court recognized that the release to Wes's Inc. did not expressly provide for reduction of the claim against the other tortfeasors, as prescribed by the version of I.C. Section 6-805 in effect at the time the release was signed. Finding that the amendment to the statute was subsequent to the filing date of Tuttle's action and that the amendment had effected substantive (not remedial or procedural) changes, the district court held that the pre-amendment version of I.C. Section 6-805 governed in this case and operated to reduce the claim against Wayment Farms in the amount of the settlement with Wes's Inc.
It has been held that statutes governing a release or covenant not to sue, and claims for contribution in an action involving joint tortfeasors are remedial and therefore retrospective. Primoff v. Duell, 381 N.Y.S.2d 947, 949 (1976); State ex rel. Simmerock v. Brackmann, 714 S.W.2d 938, 942-43 (Mo. App. 1986)(statute in question facially contemplates its application to releases executed following enactment). The Uniform Contribution Among Tort Feasors Act (UCATA), from which is derived the statutory language of I.C. Sections 6-805, 806, has been held not to affect substantive rights. Simmerock, 714 S.W.2d at 942, citing Aherron v. St. John's Mercy Medical Center, et al., 713 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Mo. 1986). As in Primoff and Simmerock, the settlement here was made long after the effective date of these statutes, although the cause of action arose prior thereto. We are in agreement with the rationale of the Primoff court that: "It must be held that the settlement was made in contemplation of the law as it was on the date of settlement." Primoff, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
We therefore reject Wayment Farms' claim that application of the 1991 amendment to I.C. Section 6-805 was a violation of rights which had vested prior to the statute's amendment. Pursuant to I.C. Section 6-805(2) as it existed at the time of the settlement, the release to Wes's Inc., which failed to provide for release of other tortfeasors, precludes reduction of the jury award by the settlement amount.
As its basis for awarding the offset to Wayment Farms, the district court relied on I.C. Section 6-1606, which prohibits double recoveries from collateral sources. Because the settlement from Wes's Inc. represented partial compensation for injuries suffered by Tuttle, the district court concluded that the amount of the settlement should be deducted from the total damages awarded by the jury regardless of the fact that Wes's Inc. was assessed with no liability for Tuttle's injuries.
A
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