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DAVIS v. SUN VALLEY SKI EDUC. FOUNDATION6/26/1997
This is a ski accident case. We affirm the trial court's grant of a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7) and address certain questions that may arise at the new trial.
I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
On February 18, 1989, Marianna Davis (Davis) took part in a training session (the training session) for ski racers sponsored by Sun Valley Ski Education Foundation, Inc. (the foundation). The foundation is a non-profit Idaho corporation that lends assistance and training to school-age students in the sport of skiing. Michel Rudigoz (Rudigoz), an employee of the foundation, set the course for the training session (the course), using parts of two ski runs on Bald Mountain at Sun Valley (the ski area) and a connecting cat track (the cat track). The cat track was narrow and contained a ninety-degree turn. The first two skiers in the training session negotiated the course without incident. Davis, the third skier, lost control on the cat track, went off the course, and hit a tree. As a result of the accident, Davis is paralyzed from the chest down.
Davis sued the foundation and Rudigoz (defendants), alleging negligence in setting the course, in failing to provide proper safety devices at the cat track, and in failing to warn of the hazards associated with the course. Defendants requested that the trial court grant them summary judgment on the ground that I.C. §§ 6-1101 through 6-1106 (the act), which define the responsibilities and liabilities of skiers and ski area operators, bars Davis from recovering for her injuries. The trial court denied the motion for
summary judgment ruling that the act does not bar recovery because defendants are not operators of the ski area.
The trial court conducted a jury trial, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict apportioning the responsibility of Davis and the defendants at fifty percent each. Based on this comparison of negligence, the trial court entered judgment for defendants.
Davis requested a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) and (7). The trial court granted a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7), ruling that two of the instructions and one of the questions in the special verdict form improperly instructed the jury regarding the law of assumption of the risk. The trial court also granted a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), ruling that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict.
Defendants appealed the grant of a new trial and the denial of their request for summary judgment. Defendants also seek rulings of this Court concerning certain evidentiary rulings the trial court made, in the event there is a new trial.
II.
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Defendants assert that the trial court should have granted them summary judgment based on the act. We disagree.
This Court has recognized that I.C. § 6-1103 sets forth the totality of the duties with which ski area operators must comply and they have no other duties. Long v. Bogus Basin Recreational Ass'n, Inc., 125 Idaho 230, 232, 869 P.2d 230, 232 (1994) (citing Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 787 P.2d 1159 (1990)). Defendants contend that they fall within the definition of "ski area operators" and, thus, had no duty to protect Davis from colliding with the tree.
The act defines "ski area operator" as follows:
"Ski area operator" means any person, partnership, corporation or other commercial entity and their agents, officers, employees or representatives, who has operational responsibility for any ski area or aerial passenger tramway.
I.C. § 6
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