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State v. Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association5/30/1997
ive may, within ninety (90) days from the time of that judgment, commence a new action in the proper court. The time between the commencement of the first and last action shall not be counted in applying any statute of limitation.
(2) As used in this section, "court" means all courts, commissions, and boards which are judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals authorized by the Constitution or statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky or of the United States of America. (emphasis added).
We are mindful that the expanded definition of "court" set out in subsection (2) of the statute specifically references "this section," i.e., KRS 413.270. We are also cognizant of the fact that there is nothing else in KRS Chapter 413 which sheds any light on the breadth of the term "court" as used elsewhere in the chapter. The circuit court concluded that KRS 413.220(3), .250 and .270(2) must be read together as effecting an overall policy concerning limitation provisions and that the broad definition of "court" in KRS 413.270 is also applicable to
KRS 413.220(3). We are unwilling to take this first very significant step of extending the reach of potentially all statutes of limitation to any body fitting within the expanded definition of "court" in KRS 413.270. However, there are other compelling grounds for concluding that although KRS 413.220(3) is not literally applicable it should and must be applied by analogy.
Statutes of limitation in general are designed to bar stale claims arising out of transactions or occurrences which took place in the distant past. Armstrong v. Logsdon, Ky.,
469 S.W.2d 342 (1971). They close the doors of the courts and are expressly intended "to be used as a blanket to smother the moribund claims" of plaintiffs and defendants. Liter v. Hoagland, 305 Ky. 329, 204 S.W.2d 219, 220 (1943). The legislative preference for prompt resolution of claims which underlies all statutes of limitation is equally compelling whether the forum is a court or a quasi-judicial tribunal. As the circuit court stated in this case: "It would be an absurd result if, for example, the Cabinet could commence a proceeding before a hearing officer of the Cabinet on a cause of action which arose ten years earlier, even though the action would be barred by the statute of limitations in every other tribunal of the Commonwealth."
Avoidance of the absurd result which concerned the circuit court does not require expanding the definition of "court." Courts in numerous jurisdictions, including Kentucky, when confronted with administrative boards conducting quasi-judicial proceedings but operating without any express limitations period in the enabling statute have applied by analogy the statute of limitation applicable to the common law predecessor to, or counterpart of, the administrative action. Thus in Scott Tobacco Co. v. Cooper, 258 Ky. 795, 81 S.W.2d 588, 590 (1934), the court concluded that actions before the former Workmen's Compensation Board must be brought within one year, the "limitation statute with reference to court actions for the recovery of negligently inflicted injuries." The court noted that the majority of courts addressing then-emerging workers compensation statutes which contained administrative hearing procedures were requiring actions before their respective boards or administrative bodies to be commenced within that period provided in the most analogous statute of limitation. Id. citing Federal Rubber Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Wisconsin, 185 Wis. 299, 201 N.W.261 (1924). The analysis provided by the Federal Rubber court seems equally apropos to the statutory proceeding in issue here:
While we concur in saying that the enforcement of a
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