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Welton v. Lucas6/19/1997
Submitted on Briefs April 17, 1997.
Lisa L. Welton (Welton), appeals from the order of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court granting Suzanne Lucas, Laurette Murphy, and Shelly Robbins' (collectively "the Respondents") motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.
The following issues are raised on appeal:
1. Where a claimant has pursued a workers' compensation claim against a corporate employer, does the exclusivity provision of § 39-71-411, MCA, preclude a suit by the claimant against the corporate shareholders in their capacity as landlords?
2. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Suzanne Lucas, Laurette Murphy and Shelly Robbins?
BACKGROUND
Welton was injured as a result of a workplace accident at Cono-Mart in Billings. Welton contends that she fell and was injured after tripping over a pipe located on the floor of the stockroom behind the beer and soda coolers where cases of beer and soda are stored; the stockroom was illuminated by light coming through the glass cooler doors. Welton claimed that she knew that the pipe was on the floor but due to poor lighting had difficulty seeing and, as a result, she tripped over the pipe on the floor while stocking shelves as part of her employment with G. M. Petroleum Distributors (G. M. Petroleum). Following the incident, Welton filed for and received workers' compensation benefits. She then filed the present suit against the owners of the property.
At the time of the accident, Welton was an employee of G. M. Petroleum, a closely held corporation that operates Cono-Mart. R. M. Grunstead, William Grunstead and the Respondents are the only shareholders of G. M. Petroleum. In addition to being shareholders of G. M. Petroleum, R. M. Grunstead, William Grunstead and the Respondents are the owners of the property and building which is leased by G. M. Petroleum and where Welton suffered her injury . R. M. Grunstead owns 50% of the building; William Grunstead and the Respondents own the remaining 50%.
In her complaint, Welton alleges that the Respondents, as owners of the building, were negligent in allowing a dangerous condition to remain on their premises. It appears that the District Court granted summary judgment against Welton under two theories. First, the court held that the Respondents were protected from liability by the exclusive remedy rule under § 39-71-411, MCA. Second, the court held that summary judgment was appropriate because Welton knew the pipe existed while the Respondents were unaware of the situation.
DISCUSSION
This Court's standard of review in appeals from summary judgment rulings is de novo. Motarie v. Northern Montana Joint Refuse Disposal District (1995), 274 Mont. 239, 242, 907 P.2d 154, 156; Mead v. M.S.B., Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 465, 470, 872 P.2d 782. When we review a district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same evaluation as the district court based on Rule 56, M.R.Civ.R. Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 900 P.2d 901. In Bruner, we set forth our inquiry:
The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred.
Bruner, 900 P.2d at 903 (citations omitt
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