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BROOKS v. NORTHWOOD LITTLE LEAGUE6/9/1997
unambiguous. Adkins v. Varn, 312 S.C. 188, 191, 439 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1993) (noting S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-3-10 to 27-3-70; see also T.W. Morton Builders, Inc. v. von Buedingen, 316 S.C. 388, 402, 450 S.E.2d 87, 95 (Ct. App. 1994) (noting courts may consider a statute's title in aid of construction to show legislative intent). This textualist approach anchors statutory meaning in the historical purpose of the text: to open up land for recreational use by the public. See S.C. Code Ann. § 27-3-10 (declaring legislative intent to make land available for recreational use). In our view, a statute does not apply only to facts in existence at the time of its adoption. Statutes must be updated functionally to reflect changes in technology, terminology, and the legal landscape. Our conclusion reflects not only the plain meaning of the Limitation on Liability of Landowners Act, but also gives effect to legislative intent in light of the purposes the statute was meant to achieve.
Brooks qualifies as a recreational user because her attendance at the game was for a recreational purpose. Even though section 27-3-20 (c) does not expressly list "T-ball" as a recreational purpose, T-Ball qualifies as a "summer-sport." Moreover, by its very terms, section 27-3-20 (c) was not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration of recreational activities. Therefore, section 27-3-20 (c) invites judicial expansion
Brooks also argues the Respondents are not immune from suit because she did not receive their permission to attend the game. We disagree. The public was invited to attend the ball game free of charge; permission was clearly implied. We do not read sections 27-3-30 and 27-3-40 as requiring a quid pro quo. Therefore, the trial judge correctly held that the Recreational Use Statute applied.
II.
Section 27-3-60 provides a gross negligence exception to the immunity afforded under section 27-3-30. "Gross negligence" is the intentional, conscious failure to do something which one ought to do or the doing of something one ought not to do. Clyburn, 317 S.C. at 53, 451 S.E.2d at 887; Rakestraw, 323 S.C. at 231, 473 S.E.2d at 893.
Gross negligence ordinarily presents a hybrid question of law and fact, but when evidence supports but one reasonable inference, the question becomes one of law for the court. Clyburn, 317 S.C. at 53, 451 S.E.2d at 887-88. In determining whether summary judgment is proper, the court must construe inferences arising from the evidence against the moving party. Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brooks, we find the record is devoid of any evidence of an intentional, conscious failure on the part of the Respondents. The evidence presents only one reasonable inference: The Respondents were not grossly negligent. The trial judge, therefore, properly held the Respondents were not grossly negligent as a matter of law.
III.
Brooks next contends that if South Carolina's Recreational Use Statute does not bar her claim, she qualifies as an "invitee" because she purchased several items at the Little League's concession stand and paid her granddaughter's team participation fee. We need not address this issue because we hold the Statute bars Brooks' claims.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial judge is
AFFIRMED.
STILWELL and HOWARD, JJ., concur.
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