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Bryan v. Burt6/6/1997
f the clot, which existed at least 48 hours before the death, would have enabled the orthopedist to administer treatment in the form of medication which would have substantially increased the patient's chances of living, according to the testimony. This was evidence of proximate cause." 229 Va. at 533, 331 S.E.2d at 446.
Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting Dr. Burt's motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence.
Second, we shall address the case against Dr. Maybach. The essence of the plaintiff's criticism of Maybach is that he mismanaged the decedent's care prior to December 13, that he should have communicated more of the patient's history to Burt, and that the handling of the two telephone calls on the 14th by Maybach's office staff was improper.
Even if we assume for purposes of this Discussion that one or more of those charges somehow support a finding of negligence, nevertheless Maybach's alleged deviations from the standard of care were too remote as a matter of law to be causally related to the decedent's death. Maybach never was afforded the opportunity to see, diagnose, or treat the decedent on the 13th. He was never asked to evaluate her complaints of pain on that day. Actually, the evidence showed he was working at a Front Royal hospital at the time. He was never asked to read the x-rays which the plaintiff now argues showed free air in the abdomen indicating a perforated ulcer.
The evidence shows that Maybach's only involvement with the decedent on the 13th consisted of two telephone calls. In the first call, he directed the patient to seek treatment at the Fauquier Hospital because he was on duty in the Front Royal hospital at the time. In the second call, Burt merely advised Maybach that the patient had been seen, evaluated, and discharged with a diagnosis of constipation.
When the telephone calls of the 14th were received, Maybach was not in his office. The decedent's daughter was told, according to the evidence, that if the patient's pain was severe she should be brought to Maybach's office or returned to the hospital. The daughter responded the family did not want to take the patient back to the hospital. The daughter was asked if she wished to leave a message for Maybach, and she declined to do so. The patient never came to Maybach's office for treatment on the 14th.
In sum, as Maybach argues, his involvement with the decedent at the pertinent times "was simply too limited, too remote and too indirect" to be causally connected to her death. Thus, we hold the trial court did not err in granting Dr. Maybach's motion to strike.
Finally, we reject the plaintiff's other assignments of error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the deposition testimony of a radiologist as part of the plaintiff's case-in-chief. The focus of that area of inquiry was upon what an emergency room physician should have seen and evaluated on x-rays, not what an expert radiologist should have seen and evaluated. And, the trial court properly excluded proof of medical expenses that had not been linked causally to any alleged malpractice of the defendants.
For these reasons, the judgment below in favor of the defendants will be Affirmed.
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