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Stapper v. GMI Holdings12/31/2001
ce that the Lee family would have modified their door opening mechanism or would not have purchased the Genie had it contained such a warning. Absent any substantial evidence of the fundamental element of causation, the court did not err in granting non-suit on appellant's failure to warn claim.
IV.
Appellant contends the court erred in limiting her to presenting evidence of 30 out of 149 consumer complaints concerning the Genie's automatic reverse mechanism, and in prohibiting her from introducing evidence that respondent destroyed all consumer complaints that predated the fire.
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining both the relevance and admissibility of evidence generally and evidence of prior and subsequent accidents specifically. (Simmons v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 341, 365; Milton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 133, 138.) Rulings on the admission of evidence are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431.)
a. Multiple Complaints
The court reviewed many of the complaints individually and, given the description of the accidents contained therein, could reasonably conclude they were insufficiently similar to appellant's accident to be relevant to the defect issue of the instant circumstances. Furthermore, appellant has not specifically demonstrated, as is her obligation on appeal (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115; see also Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564), why the excluded complaints were relevant to proving a design defect that allegedly caused her injuries. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's limitation.
b. Destruction
The subject fire occurred in March 1995. In 1998, appellant deposed an employee of respondent who was deemed most knowledgeable about claims and litigation concerning the Genie. The employee brought to the deposition "litigation matters" from 1982 to 1998 and consumer complaints from 1995 to 1998, explaining that all consumer complaints prior to 1995 had been destroyed, a reference to the physical complaints themselves. Respondent's written document retention policy is to keep only the last three years of complaints. Hence, by the time of the employee's 1998 deposition, respondent would not have had physical complaints earlier than 1995 in its records. Respondent, however, did retain and provide to appellant computer records containing brief summaries of claims back to 1982.
We find no abuse in the court's refusal to allow evidence that the pre-1995 physical complaints had been destroyed. There was no evidence that the physical complaints were willfully destroyed to suppress relevant evidence, and appellant remained able to introduce evidence of the fact and nature of the relevant pre-1995 complaints.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Stevens, J.
Simons, J.
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