 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Samuels v. Mix12/30/1999
dant contends that facts demonstrating a typical attorney malpractice plaintiff's knowledge of a typical defendant's malpractice are likely to exist peculiarly within the plaintiff's access and control. According to defendant, therefore, we should as a matter of policy declare that the burden of proving such facts, when relevant under section 340.6, belongs to plaintiff. Again, we are not persuaded.
We have not routinely found exceptions to Evidence Code section 500's general rule on the basis of relative access to evidence. (See, e.g., Adams v. Murakami, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 120-121 [declining to burden defendant with proving the state of his own finances when punitive damages are in issue].) As plaintiff points out, nearly all the allegations required of plaintiffs in tort and contract actions relate to defendants' acts or omissions and so might be thought, almost by definition, to describe matters peculiarly within the defendants' knowledge or control. That circumstance, however, has not occasioned a wholesale departure in tort and contract actions from the ordinary allocation of proof burdens.
Moreover, to the extent section 340.6(a)'s one-year-from-discovery limitations period may be triggered by a circumstance having no necessary relation to the plaintiff's actual state of mind(namely, that the plaintiff "through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered" the defendant's wrongful conduct(no reason appears for assuming that, in any given case, "knowledge . . . concerning the particular fact" (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 660) or facts actually triggering the limitations period will lie within one party's grasp but not the other's.
In light of Evidence Code section 500's mandate and the plain language of section 340.6(a), we need not strain to discern (because we are not free to impose) a universally "desirable result in terms of public policy" (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 660) for all section 340.6(a) disputes. As we recently observed, "the affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations should not be characterized by courts as either `favored' or `disfavored,' " as " he two public policies . . . for repose and . . . for disposition on the merits . . . are equally strong, the one being no less important or substantial than the other." (Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 396, citing numerous authorities.) In any event, " o establish any particular limitations period under any particular statute of limitations entails the striking of a balance between the two," and thus " o establish any such period under any such statute belongs to the Legislature alone [citation], subject only to constitutional constraints [citation]." (Id. at pp. 396-397.)
Finally, the record in this case reveals no superior or enhanced access to evidence on plaintiff's part. The main witness on delayed discovery was the attorney, Hildre. While common sense suggests Samuels may at the outset have enjoyed certain practical advantages in contacting Hildre, whom she had consulted in his professional capacity, no reason appears to assume, in assessing "the availability of the evidence to the parties" (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 660), that, ultimately, either party enjoyed special or unequal access to Hildre's testimony. We agree with plaintiff that no valid basis exists for shifting to her the burden of proof on the discovery prong of section 340.6(a) on the speculation that she had more peculiar access to relevant evidence.
In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate that our judicial interference with the "traditional allocation of the burden of proof"
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 California Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|