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Samuels v. Mix12/30/1999
fense, that defense would have been forfeited (Minton v. Cavaney (1961) 56 Cal.2d 576, 581) and plaintiff would have been entitled to a trial on the merits of her claim, regardless of whether her action was timely under the terms of section 340.6 (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 999 [legislatively imposed medical malpractice statute of limitations could not alter the substance of such actions]).
In this case of first impression, defendant obviously cannot cite any existing law burdening plaintiff with negating the facts essential to section 340.6(a)'s one-year-from-discovery limitation defense to attorney malpractice actions. (See generally, California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154 [noting that Evidence Code section 500's general rule allocating the burden of proof "does not supersede other, specific rules established by statute or judicial decision"].) It follows that, until and unless we create a new exception to the general rule, the burden of proving plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of defendant's wrongdoing in connection with that defense falls statutorily to defendant. (Evid. Code, § 500; see, e.g., Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 53 [declining to create new exception to Evidence Code section 500 for insurer seeking reimbursement of defense costs].)
Thus, in accordance with section 340.6(a)'s plain language, defendant, if he is to avail himself of the statute's one-year-from-discovery limitation defense, has the burden of proving, under the "traditional allocation of the burden of proof" (Fukuda v. City of Angels, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 820, citing Evid. Code, § 500), that plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the facts alleged to constitute defendant's wrongdoing more than one year prior to filing this action. Defendant's remaining arguments may be considered as proffered grounds for our declaring a departure from Evidence Code section 500's general rule.
2. Common Law Discovery Rule
Defendant first suggests that, in enacting section 340.6, the Legislature intended that burdens of proof thereunder be allocated just as they have been allocated under the common law discovery rule, a rule of delayed accrual that lies for the benefit of some plaintiffs with professional malpractice claims. (See Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 397-398 [generally describing the rule].) For the following reasons, we are not persuaded.
The common law discovery rule, where applicable, indefinitely delays accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably has cause to discover the facts constituting it. As we have explained, the discovery rule "may be expressed by the Legislature or implied by the courts" and is the " `most important' " exception to the general rule that a cause of action accrues when the allegedly wrongful result occurs. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397, citing Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 179 (Neel); 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Actions, § 463, p. 583.)
"In cases of professional malpractice . . . postponement of the period of limitations until discovery finds justification in the special nature of the relationship between the professional . . . and client." (Neel, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 187-188.) Thus, in certain recognized contexts, a client's reasonably delayed discovery of facts constituting actionable professional misbehavior may delay accrual of a cause of action based thereon. (United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586, 596 [listing types of actions in which "cou
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