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Dubin v. Wakuzawa12/1/1998
cost; (2) decrease the costs of the recovery system for medical malpractice and improve the efficiency of its procedures; (3) impose appropriate sanctions on errant health care providers; (4) provide and improve the machinery for resolving patient grievances against health care providers . . . ." Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 671-76, in 1976 Senate Journal, at 1182.
Inasmuch as the state has in interest in assuring the provision of affordable, high quality health care to its citizens, such purposes are legitimate.
We next inquire whether HRS ch. 671 rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In an effort to fulfil the aforementioned purposes, the legislature has enacted a comprehensive system of medical malpractice dispute resolution, which is designed to weed out frivolous claims and promote negotiated settlements, thus avoiding the high costs associated with litigation. Requiring participation in the conciliation process as a precondition to initiating a lawsuit is a rational method of ensuring full participation in the system. This court has noted, in the context of automobile insurance reform, that "preventing suit except in those instances where injuries are serious `bears a rational relation to the legislative purposes of assuring adequate protection for [tort] victims and keeping insurance premiums affordable.'" Del Rio, 87 Hawaii at 306, 955 P.2d at 99 (quoting Makanju v. Saunders, 519 A.2d 703, 704 (D.C. 1987) (citation omitted)). It is also noteworthy that the system established by HRS ch. 671 does not preclude an injured party from seeking to litigate his claims; it merely requires him to submit them to a medical claims conciliation panel before doing so. We hold that Dubin has not been denied the equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the United States and Hawaii constitutions.
E. Dismissal Of Dubin's First Amended Complaint For Failure To Meet The Procedural Requirements Of HRS Ch. 671 Does Not Constitute A Retroactive Application Of The Statutes.
Finally, Dubin urges that Tobosa v. Owens, 69 Haw. 305, 315, 741 P.2d 1280, 1287 (1987), requires that his suit in this matter not be dismissed because it "present issues not previously decided" and "` he termination of ostensibly actionable claims without forewarning hardly seems consistent with our common-law traditions.'" However, the present matter differs significantly from Tobosa in that, in Tobosa, "there was substantial compliance with [HRS § 671-12]." 69 Haw. at 315, 741 P.2d at 1286. Dubin, by contrast, made no attempt to comply. Dubin, an attorney, who was charged with knowledge of the broad definition of the term "medical tort," as set forth in HRS § 671-2 and unambiguously asserted claims that arose from an alleged breach of the physician-patient privilege, nevertheless chose to sidestep the requirements of HRS §§ 671-12 and 671-16 by filing the present lawsuit, rather than first seeking resolution of his claims by an MCCP, as required by those statutes. Whether Dubin believes them to be fair or not, the legislature has clearly exercised its prerogative to establish reasonable procedural prerequisites to the adjudication of medical malpractice claims. Dubin has advanced no plausible support for his tacit assertion that he is entitled to be exempted from them. We hold that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Dubin's first amended complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of Dubin's first amended complaint.
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