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State v. Torres12/3/1998
ned evidence." Id. at 546. In applying the Supreme Court's decision in Lee, we previously relied on four factors in determining that an accomplice's in-custody statement satisfied the Confrontation Clause: (1) the absence of any offer of leniency for the declarant's statement; (2) the statement was against the declarant's penal interest; (3) the statement did not attempt to shift responsibility away from the declarant; and (4) the statement was corroborated by independent evidence. See ; see also (relying on Earnest). We believe, however, that this analysis is no longer necessary in order to ensure that declarations against interest admissible under Rule 11-804(B)(3) satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
{29} The Court in Lee addressed a statement admitted pursuant to Illinois law. In response to a suggestion that the statement was a declaration against interest, the Court determined that " hat concept defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis. We decide this case as involving a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant." Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 n.5. By contrast, in our interpretation of Rule 11-804(B)(3), we have adopted the analysis articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Williamson. In that case, which involved the confession of an accomplice that was made while in custody and that incriminated the defendant, the Court stated that "the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory-which our reading of Rule 804(b)(3) requires-is itself one of the `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a statement admissible under the Confrontation Clause." Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605 (citing Lee, 476 U.S. at 543-45). With the exception of the final factor articulated in Earnest, we believe that the Earnest analysis has been subsumed within our interpretation of Rule 11-804(B)(3). In evaluating whether a declarant's statements satisfy Rule 11-804(B)(3) and whether a reasonable person would not have made the statements unless believing them to be true, the trial court should examine the statement in light of all surrounding circumstances, including to whom the statement was made, see , whether the declarant attempted to curry favor with authorities, see , and whether the statement is collateral to the declarant's criminal liability or exculpatory of the declarant, see Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600. Thus, we believe that, given our interpretation of Rule 11-804(B)(3), the concerns expressed by the Court in Lee no longer apply in New Mexico. See ) ("The fear that inculpatory statements are unreliable stems largely from the presumption that such statements are self-serving, offered only to shift the blame from the declarant to another. But when, as here, the inculpatory portion of a statement is also against the declarant's interest, or when it is neutral because the declarant has not attempted to diminish his own role, there is little reason to suspect that portion of an otherwise reliable statement is untrustworthy. "); United States v. Aldana, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1328 n.2 (D. Utah 1998) ("New Mexico could interpret its own version of 804(b)(3) differently than that in Williamson. Many states have done so. . . . If a state has followed Williamson, no confrontation issue should exist. If not, an analysis under and [Roberts] is required to show the requisite reliability."). Compare ) ("We think that where, as here, it is clear that the statements inculpating both the declarant and the defendant were not made in order to limit the declarant's exposure to criminal liability, the declarations against interest exception is properly treated as firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 614 (1997), with Earnest v. Dorse
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