 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Dow Chemical Company v. Mahlum12/31/1998
counsel of choice. According to Dow Chemical, it was severely prejudiced at trial by relying on counsel that were substantially less well prepared for certain critical tasks than its attorneys of record. The Mahlums argue that both attorneys had conflicts of interest and that neither of them produced timely proper evidence of Dow Corning's consent to dual representation.
While Dow Chemical had a letter from Dow Corning waiving any conflict that might arise from Ms. Lawson's representation of Dow Chemical at trial, Dow Chemical did not present that waiver to the court in a timely fashion, and apparently presented no waiver regarding Mr. Donley. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the Dow Corning attorneys to represent Dow Chemical at trial.
iv. Conclusion
In Conclusion, we reverse the district court's judgment on the claims of fraudulent concealment, concert of action, and aiding and abetting. Consequently, we also vacate the award of punitive damages. We affirm the judgment on the claim of negligent undertaking, and we affirm the district court's order denying Dow Chemical's motion for a new trial.
Rose J.
AMES, D.J., Concurring:
I concur in the opinion's analysis and result except that I do not believe the trademark agreement has much, if any, probative value in determining Dow Chemical's negligent undertaking liability.
Ames D.J.
SPRINGER, C.J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part:
I concur in the court's opinion affirming the trial court's judgment on the negligent undertaking claim; but I Dissent to the court's reversal of the punitive damage awards.
Unlike my colleagues, I see this case as a case in which there is sufficient proof of implied malice for the Jury to award punitive damages.
Punitive damages may be awarded where a defendant is guilty of malice. See NRS 42.005(l). Malice may be express or implied. Id. Express malice is present when a defendant "intended to injure a person." NRS 42.001(3); see also Clark v. Lubritz, 113 Nev. 1089, 1099, 944 P. 2d 861, 867 (1997). Implied malice is present where a defendant is guilty of "despicable conduct which is engaged in with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." NRS 42.001(3); Lubritz, 113 Nev. at 1099, 944 P.2d at 867. The jury rendered a special verdict that Dow Chemical had acted "with conscious disregard of the safety of others." I see no reason for interfering with the jury's special verdict and would, on the basis of that verdict, affirm the punitive damage judgment.
NRS 42.001 (1) defines conscious disregard as having "knowledge of the probable harmful consequences of a wrongful act and a willful and deliberate failure to act to avoid those consequences." The special verdict finding that Dow Chemical was guilty of consciously disregarding the safety of Mrs. Mahlum, and others like her, in my view, is all that is necessary to support the punitive damage award in this case. In addition to finding the requisite conscious disregard, the jury filled out its special verdict with findings that Dow Chemical was actually aware of the danger posed by the breast implant (the danger, I would propose, that was created when Dow Chemical "work together in a joint development program" with Dow Corning, under the agreement in which Dow Chemical and Dow Corning "developed . . . a body of technical information concerning the biological activity of certain organosilicon compounds.") In addition to finding that Dow Chemical was "aware of the probable dangerous consequences of its conduct," the jury also specifically concluded t
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Nevada Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|