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Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.11/12/1998
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
(Super. Ct. No. VC023556)
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Thomas I. McKnew, Jr., Judge. Reversed.
Plaintiff and appellant Tina Cloud is a former employee of Northrop Grumman Corp. Northrop and plaintiff's former supervisor at Northrop are the defendants and respondents (collectively "Northrop"). In November of 1995, Northrop terminated plaintiff's employment. In June of 1996, plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 (liquidation) bankruptcy protection. (11 U.S.C. § § 701 et seq.) In the schedule of assets she filed with the bankruptcy court, plaintiff did not disclose any claim or potential claim against Northrop.
Several months later, while her bankruptcy action was pending, plaintiff filed a complaint against Northrop with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. In November of 1996, she received a letter from the Department notifying her of her right to file a lawsuit within one year. In December of 1996 (shortly after she received a bankruptcy discharge, but while her bankruptcy action remained pending), plaintiff filed the instant wrongful termination and sexual harassment action. Several months after her lawsuit was filed, plaintiff's bankruptcy case was closed, while her lawsuit continued.
After these events, Northrop moved for judgment on the pleadings. Northrop requested that the court take judicial notice of plaintiff's bankruptcy filings, which revealed that plaintiff had not scheduled her claims against Northrop as assets of her bankruptcy estate. Northrop's motion was based on two grounds. First, Northrop contended that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue her civil action because, according to bankruptcy law, plaintiff's claim against Northrop was the property of the bankruptcy estate and the bankruptcy trustee was therefore the real party in interest. Second, Northrop contended that plaintiff was "judicially estopped" from pursuing this lawsuit because of her prior failure to schedule the lawsuit as an asset of the bankruptcy estate.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (See, e.g., Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 1998) §§ 7:275, 7:322; Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, plaintiff opposed Northrop's motion in part by filing her own declaration. Although not technically proper, the evidence plaintiff presented illustrates important reasons for our ultimate Disposition.
Plaintiff's declaration alleged that she suffered emotionally and financially as a result of the wrongful actions of Northrop, and that several months after her termination, she consulted a bankruptcy attorney in order to avoid losing her house. Plaintiff alleged that when she filled out bankruptcy documents as instructed by her bankruptcy attorney, she did not know that valid grounds existed for a lawsuit against Northrop, and hence did not list such a claim. Although she had previously consulted a different (non-bankruptcy) lawyer for advice on whether she had grounds for a claim against Northrop, plaintiff alleged that she was too distraught at that initial meeting to detail the course of events coherently. The non-bankruptcy lawyer consequently advised her that any advice as to whether she had a claim would have to await presentation of the facts in a more meaningful way. This allegedl
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