 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp.11/12/1998
urt held that "privity" was not a necessary component to its "newly articulated doctrine of judicial estoppel," Ryan also made clear that restraint should be exercised in applying the doctrine, and expended considerable effort to back away from the more extreme implications of its prior seminal ruling in Oneida. Ryan emphasized that "this court has expressly left open the question of whether . . . nondisclosure, standing alone, can support a finding that a plaintiff has asserted inconsistent positions within the meaning of the judicial-estoppel doctrine." (Ryan, supra, 81 F.3d at p. 362.) Ryan further stated that " e need not decide this issue here, and we decline to do so, because we conclude that judicial estoppel would be inappropriate in any event as there is no evidence that [the debtor] acted in bad faith." (Ibid.)
Ryan thus concluded that nondisclosure unaccompanied by bad faith is insufficient to justify the application of judicial estoppel. The Ryan court explained: "Asserting inconsistent positions does not trigger the application of judicial estoppel unless `intentional self-contradiction is . . . used as a means of obtaining unfair advantage.' [Citation.] Thus, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply `when the prior position was taken because of a good faith mistake rather than as part of a scheme to mislead the court.' [Citation.] An inconsistent argument sufficient to invoke judicial estoppel must be attributable to intentional wrongdoing. . . . he doctrine only applies to deliberate inconsistencies that are `tantamount to a knowing misrepresentation to or even fraud on the court.'" (Ryan, supra, 81 F.3d at pp. 362-363.)
Turning to the specific facts involved in Ryan, the court noted that "there is no basis in this case for inferring that [the debtor] deliberately asserted inconsistent positions in order to gain advantage -- i.e., that it played fast and loose with the courts. There is no evidence that the nondisclosure played any role in the confirmation of the plan or that disclosure of the potential claims would have lead to a different result. Although it may generally be reasonable to assume that a debtor who fails to disclose a substantial asset in bankruptcy proceedings gains an advantage, the undisputed facts weigh against such an inference in this case. . . . it appears that [the debtor] derived and intended no appreciable benefit from its nondisclosure." (Ryan, supra, 81 F.3d at p. 363.)
The Ryan court additionally noted that "defendant cites no case in which a court held that intent to mislead or deceive could be inferred from the mere fact of nondisclosure, and we are aware of none. We are persuaded, however, that policy considerations militate against adopting a rule that the requisite intent for judicial estoppel can be inferred from the mere fact of nondisclosure in a bankruptcy proceeding. Such a rule would unduly expand the reach of judicial estoppel in post-bankruptcy proceedings and would inevitably result in the preclusion of viable claims on the basis of inadvertent or good-faith inconsistencies. . . . e are unwilling to treat careless or inadvertent nondisclosures as equivalent to deliberate manipulation when administering the `strong medicine' of judicial estoppel. [Citation.] . . . [ ] . . . We therefore reject defendant's argument that intent may be inferred for purposes of judicial estoppel solely from nondisclosure notwithstanding the affirmative disclosure requirement of the Bankruptcy Code. [ ] Because [the debtor] did not act with the intent to play fast and loose with the courts that is required for application of the judicial-estoppel doctrine, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against [the de
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 California Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|