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Hill v. Safford Unified School District12/30/1997
ts out that school teachers and administrators have both a statutory and common law duty not to subject students within their charge to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm through acts, omissions, or school policy. See A.R.S. § 15-341(A)(17) (governing board shall provide for adequate supervision over pupils); Jesik v. Maricopa County Community College District, 125 Ariz. 543, 611 P.2d 547 (1980) (statute imposes duty of protection for students against torts). In a different context, our supreme court recently addressed the question of the common law duty of a premises owner to protect a guest from criminal attack. Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Assoc., Inc., 189 Ariz. 206, 941 P.2d 218 (1997). The court acknowledged the special relationship principle set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965), which states there is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and the third person which imposes a duty upon the [defendant] to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and the [plaintiff] which gives to the [plaintiff] a right of protection. Id. at 207-08, 941 P.2d at 219-20. The teacher-student relationship is a special relation that creates a duty of due care. See Rogers; see also Fedie v. Travelodge International Inc., 162 Ariz. 263, 782 P.2d 739 (App. 1989). Hence, the relationship between the school and Hill imposed an additional obligation on the school to take reasonable precautions for Hill's safety. That the school owed duties of supervision and care to Hill, however, is not dispositive of the question whether summary judgment was appropriate. The essence of those duties is to exercise reasonable care in light of foreseeable and unreasonable risks. See Martinez; Rogers. Thus, the essential question is whether, on the undisputed material facts, a reasonable jury could conclude the school breached its duties to Hill. See Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 802 P.2d 1000 (1990). We conclude it could not.
Alleged Breach of Duty
Ordinarily, it is a jury's function as fact finder to determine whether a risk of harm created by a defendant was foreseeable and unreasonable. See Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of America, 163 Ariz. 539, 789 P.2d 1040 (1990). However, "in approaching the question of negligence or unreasonable risk, `the courts set outer limits'" and where reasonable persons could not differ, the court properly takes the issue from the jury. Rogers, 170 Ariz. at 402, 825 P.2d at 23 quoting Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts 15.3 at 355 (2d ed. 1986); see also Orme School; Flowers v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Ariz. 495, 616 P.2d 955 (App. 1980); Morris v. Ortiz, 103 Ariz. 119, 437 P.2d 652 (1968). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, "we look at whether sufficient evidence of foreseeability and possible prevention was presented to create a genuine issue of material fact." Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 211, 941 P.2d at 223; see Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 691 P.2d 1078 (1984) (summary judgment proper if insufficient evidence of breach of duty).
In its extensive minute entry, the trial court observed: At the oral argument, this Judge repeatedly asked counsel for the Plaintiff what it was that the school district did, or what it was that the school district failed to do, that constituted the negligence for which it should be held liable. Essentially, the answer that the court was given was that they should have done something to keep Clint Hill from being killed, and because he was killed the district was liable. The Court does not believe that the responsibili
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