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Hill v. Safford Unified School District12/30/1997
ty of the school goes so far as to impose what is essentially strict liability for anything that might happen to a student.
We note that appellant's briefs on appeal display a similar generality, primarily maintaining that the school "knew or should have realized that Scott Fast might avail himself of the opportunity to commit a tort or crime towards Clint Hill," and " failed to provide any security or disciplinary measures to protect ." To determine the propriety of the trial court's ruling, we differentiate and address two recurring claims underlying appellant's argument and the evidence with respect to each.
1. School's Obligation to Supervise and Discipline
Appellant contends that the school created an unreasonable risk to Hill when it failed to properly supervise Fast on May 20 by not disciplining him pursuant to A.R.S. § 15-341(A)(13) and (A)(14), which provide:
"A. The governing board shall:"
"* * *"
"13. Hold pupils to strict account for disorderly conduct on school property."
"14. Discipline students for disorderly conduct on the way to and from school."
Appellant argues that this statute imposes liability on a school for the tortious conduct of a student whether committed on or off school premises, and that the school "should have perceived a risk to Clint Hill that Scott Fast would act irrationally because of his [gang] affiliation, and that irrational conduct may result in injury or death" to Hill. Although we agree with appellant that liability for supervisory omissions may not necessarily be circumscribed by school boundaries, Rogers, we cannot find that the school either failed to meet its statutory duty or created an unreasonable risk of harm to Hill.
Sections 15-341(A)(13) and (14) require schools to proscribe, Judge and rectify student conduct. See also A.R.S. § 15-843(B). Although not determinative on the question of negligence, this court has previously held that student discipline is a matter entrusted to schools and their governing boards' discretion, and judicial intervention is called for only to correct "a manifest abuse of discretion." Tucson Public Schools, District No. 1 of Pima County v. Green, 17 Ariz. App. 91, 94, 495 P.2d 861, 864 (1972); see also Kelly v. Martin, 16 Ariz. App. 7, 490 P.2d 836 (1971) (legislature delegated control of high school affairs to the school governing board, and courts possess only limited power to review the reasonableness of school disciplinary regulations and actions). Other courts have held that schools have wide discretion in disciplining students' behavior where the disciplinary policies and rules are reasonable and rationally related to the schools' purpose in providing public education. See Beshears v. Unified School District No. 305, 930 P.2d 1376 (Kan. 1997); Bencic v. City of Malden, 587 N.E.2d 795 (Mass. App. 1992). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that school districts, teachers, and administrators have a substantial interest in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds, and a school's authority to maintain security and order requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985).
After the September 20 verbal altercation between Hill and Fast was brought to the school's attention, it was within the school's discretion, based on its disciplinary guidelines, to decide whether and to what extent to punish either student. The school investigated the matter, briefly detained both boys, took their statements, and decided no further action was necessary. Although school officials had called police
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