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JOHNSON v. KNOXVILLE COMMUNITY SCH. DIST.11/26/1997
d. Iowa R. Evid. 702. Further, the opinions are not based on a reliable foundation and are not relevant.
Actually, the motion sought to have the district court apply the analysis for admission of expert testimony according to principles laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and hold Dr. Nordine's testimony inadmissible under those principles.
The district court heard and denied the motion on the morning of trial. The plaintiffs reasserted their objection prior to Dr. Nordine's testimony. They claimed there was no scientific evidence that OCD traits could be inherited through a parent, and noted Dr. Nordine's testimony was based solely on a two-hour interview. They maintained that Dr. Nordine impermissibly formed an opinion of the mental condition of Joel Johnson, whose condition was not at issue in the case. The plaintiffs also contended that Dr. Nordine's testimony should have been excluded because he was deposed only one day prior to the discovery deadline set by the court and appeared without any final report or opinion. Finally, they claimed the prejudicial effect of Dr. Nordine's opinion outweighs any probative value it may have. The district court denied these objections and Dr. Nordine was allowed to present expert testimony.
Iowa Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Our case law decided both before and after the adoption of this rule is clear that "we are committed to a liberal view on the admissibility of expert testimony, and we have been quite deferential to the district court in the exercise of its discretion in that area." Mensink v. American Grain, 564 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Iowa 1997). We will not reverse the district court's admission of expert testimony "absent a manifest abuse of that discretion to the prejudice of the complaining [570 NW2d Page 637]
party." Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 497 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Iowa 1993).
We have laid down several principles governing the admissibility of expert testimony. First, the testimony must aid the jury in resolving a disputed issue. Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817, 823 (Iowa 1997). Second, the testimony must be reliable. Id. This requirement necessarily follows from the first because unreliable testimony cannot assist a trier of fact. Id. Third, the amount of foundation necessary to establish reliability depends on the complexity of the testimony and the likely impact of the testimony on the fact-finding process. Id. On this point we said in State v. Hall:
Determinations of admissibility of such evidence must necessarily be made on an ad hoc basis, . . . and it would be impossible to establish rules binding in every case. Obviously the complexity of the subject matter will influence the foundational showing of reliability. For example, the foundation for neutron activation analysis . . . or polygraph evidence . . . would require greater input from the scientific community than, for example, blow-ups of handwriting exemplars, ballistic comparisons, or tire tracks.
State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1980) (citations omitted). Last, there is no requirement that the expert be able to express an opinion with absolute certainty. Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 823. A lack of absolute certainty goes to the weight of the expert's testimony, not to its admissibility. Id.<
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